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Secondary share sales at the initial public offering (IPO) by insiders happen 
frequently and on a large scale. Current literature offers mixed explanations. For example, 
signaling theory (Leland & Pyle, 1977) suggests that secondary share sales at the IPO by 
insiders signal poor quality of the IPO firm. The premise is that insiders have more 
private information about the firm than outsiders. Therefore, insider sales should be 
indicative of trouble in the firm. This implies that insiders’ secondary share sales will be 
associated with poor pre- and post-IPO performance. Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976) suggests that insiders will lower their commitment to the firm after they sell part of 
their shares; after such sales, managerial and firm interests are more poorly aligned. This 
theory suggests that poor post-IPO performance is causally associated with insiders’ 
 
 
secondary share sales at the IPO. Finally, risk aversion may drive insiders to diversify 
their risk away from the focal firm by selling secondary shares at the IPO. This would 
suggest that sales have nothing to do with firm quality or managerial commitment.  
Although the above theories provide different implications for this practice, the 
mixed nature of their explanations prevent us from having a clear understanding of the 
phenomenon. Additionally, prior studies are unable to tease them apart. To address this 
issue, this dissertation investigates the following related questions: what factors predict 
insiders’ secondary share sales at the IPO and how do such sales affect various firm 
performances. Only by looking at the antecedents and consequences of insiders’ share 
sales at the IPO, as well as finding exogenous variation that affects secondary share sales 
and is unrelated to the characteristics of the firm, can we see if the sales are associated 
with firm quality or risk aversion or if insiders lower their commitment after sales.  
The answers to these questions are investigated in three essays. In Essay 1, I ask 
which chief executive officers (CEOs) sell shares at the IPO and under what conditions? 
Using a sample of 651 U.S. software IPOs from 1990 to 2011, I find that when more of 
the CEOs’ wealth is invested in their firms, they are more likely to sell. The effect is 
especially strong for CEO founders. Interestingly, when board members also engage in 
equity share sales at the IPO, CEOs are more likely to sell. This latter result suggests 
weakened board oversight of the CEOs. Using an instrumental variable approach, I tease 
apart contemporaneous selling due to poor firm quality and selling that only occurs with 
the reduction of oversight.  
 In Essay 2, I ask when equity share sales at the IPO influence the IPO 
underpricing. Through an analysis of 633 IPOs in the United States’ (U.S.) computer 
 
 
software industry, I find that the equity share sales by outside directors (venture 
capitalists and other institutional investors) are associated with upward offer price 
revision pre-IPO and lower IPO underpricing. The interpretation is that outside directors 
may be able to bargain for a higher offer price when they attempt to sell part of their 
equity shares at the IPO. As such, the upward offer price revision pre-IPO results from 
outsiders’ bargaining leads to lower the IPO underpricing. These results are robust to a 
Heckman two-stage approach that addresses potential selection bias.  
 In Essay 3, I examine whether insiders’ secondary share sales at the IPO impacts 
a variety of performance measures post-IPO and the contingencies under which any 
impact may vary. Through the analysis of 500 IPOs of the U.S. computer software 
industry, in general, I find that insiders’ secondary share sales at the IPO are not 
associated with sales or sales growth. Rather, they are only associated with slower 
research and development (R&D) growth in the year post-IPO. This effect is less 
negative for large firms. The results are robust to an instrumental variable approach to 
address the potential endogeneity issues.  
 Taken together, this dissertation finds that insiders’ secondary share sales are not 
significantly associated with post-IPO firm performances, providing no support to 
signaling theory or agency theory. The findings are more consistent with risk aversion 
theory and imply that insiders’ secondary share sales at the IPO are not a significant 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
  
To align interests between management and owners, equity ownership has been 
widely adopted in the last several decades. Whether and how equity ownership affects 
managerial behavior and firm outcomes has been a research interest for scholars for a 
long time (Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009). Although prior studies suggest 
that equity ownership does affect executive actions, the link between equity ownership, 
executive actions and organizational outcomes can be described as weak (Devers, 
McNamara, Wiseman, and Arrfelt, 2008; Wowak and Hambrick, 2010). Several 
theoretical perspectives such as agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), signaling 
theory (Leland & Pyle, 1977), and risk aversion are drawn upon to examine equity 
ownership-related research questions. In addition, because of the limitations of research 
design, data, and methodologies, many prior studies cannot effectively identify causal 
relationships between the variables of interest. To tease the theories apart and make 
causal inferences, this dissertation examines the antecedents and consequences of insiders’ 
equity share sales at the IPO and adopts an instrumental variable approach to address 
potential endogeneity issues.  
 An IPO is a good context to investigate equity ownership. An IPO provides 
insiders an opportunity to sell equity shares (known as secondary shares) along with 
newly issued shares (primary shares) to the public on the IPO date. By selling equity 
shares at the IPO, insiders can change their equity ownership in the firm and these sales 
may affect incentive alignment, which provides an opportunity to investigate the 




studying the IPO firms. First, they are generally comparable to each other. They are 
usually at an early stage in their development, need to raise financial capital, and in order 
to go public they must receive at least an acceptable evaluation from an underwriter. 
Second, whether insiders can sell secondary shares at the IPO is partly dependent on 
external market conditions at the time of the IPO and, as such, is partly exogenous. This 
allows me to adopt an instrumental variable approach and separate signaling and 
treatment effects. Lastly, secondary share sales are common, and this makes the study 
feasible. 
 In Essay 1, I investigate the antecedents of CEO equity share sales at the IPO. It is 
usually interpreted as a negative signal that CEOs sell equity shares at the IPO because of 
possible moral hazard and signaling concern. However, in the past 21 years in the U.S. 
software industry, over a quarter of CEOs sold part of their equity shares at the IPO. The 
research questions in this essay are given that share sales at the IPO may be interpreted as 
a negative signal by the market, what drives CEOs to sell and why do board members 
permit CEOs from selling? Drawing on risk aversion and endorsement arguments in 
behavioral agency theory, I argue that when much of the CEOs’ wealth is tied up in a 
firm, CEOs are exposed to high risk. To lower risk, CEOs are likely to sell. In addition, I 
find that this relationship is stronger when a CEO is the founder. If we believe founder 
status is correlated negatively with CEO wealth, this provides further evidence in support 
of the risk diversification hypothesis. I also find that when board members sell shares at 
the IPO, CEOs are more likely to sell. To eliminate a negative signal, board members 
should prevent secondary share selling. However, if they themselves attempt to sell part 




from selling as well. To draw a causal relationship between board members’ share sales 
and CEO share sales, I adopt an instrumental variable analysis. To sum up, risk aversion 
and weakened oversight improve the likelihood of CEO equity share sales at the IPO.  
 In Essay 2, I investigate the impact of insiders’ equity share sales at the IPO on 
the IPO’s underpricing. Although it is widely documented in theories and anecdotal 
evidence that insiders’ share sales at the IPO may be a negative signal, I find that 
secondary share sales at the IPO may benefit the IPO firm by lowering underpricing. 
Underpricing is the difference between stock closing price on the IPO date and offer price 
and is a measure of the amount of money left “on the table” for the IPO firms. Therefore, 
a lower underpricing indicates less money left on the table, which suggests that the IPO 
firms raise more proceeds from selling the same amount of shares to the public. I find 
that not every insider’s share sales at the IPO have the same influence on the IPO 
underpricing. Specifically, outside directors’ (venture capitalists and other institutional 
investors) share sales at IPO are significantly associated with lower underpricing. I also 
examine the possible mechanism and find that outside directors’ share sales at the IPO 
are significantly associated with upward IPO offer price revision. That is, when outside 
directors attempt to sell part of their shares at the IPO, they are able to bargain effectively 
for a higher IPO offer price so that they can sell their shares at a higher price. Therefore, 
a higher offer price benefits not only outside directors but also the IPO firm. Interestingly, 
CEOs’ share sales at the IPO are found to have no significant impact on underpricing or 
upward offer price revision. The reason may be that VCs and other institutional investors 
have repeated business relationships with underwriters and hence have more power in 




only one opportunity to have a transaction with underwriters and hence does not have 
much bargaining power over underwriters. In the IPO process, the underwriter is a 
powerful player and may result in selection bias of the IPO firms. That is, more 
prestigious underwriters choose IPO firms of higher quality. To address this concern, I 
adopted a Heckman two-stage approach and found robust results. In summary, insiders’ 
share sales at the IPO may be a negative signal to the market but it can benefit the IPO 
firms when outside directors sell part of their shares. 
In Essay 3, I examine the impact of insiders’ equity share sales at the IPO on post-
IPO firm performance. Agency theory suggests that when insiders’ wealth is contingent 
on firm performance, insiders’ interest and firm interest are more aligned. Accordingly, 
when insiders sell part of their equity shares at the IPO, their interest is less aligned with 
that of the firm and insiders may decrease their effort after such sales. As a result, a firm 
may experience poor performance. To test this prediction, I examine how insiders’ equity 
share sales at the IPO influence post-IPO performance. Through the analysis of 500 IPOs 
of the U.S. computer software industry, I find that the percentage of secondary shares in 
an offering is associated with slower R&D growth in the year post-IPO. This effect is less 
negative for large firms. In addition, I also use other performance outcomes and find no 
significant impacts. That is, the negative effect of insiders’ secondary share sales is only 
found on the R&D growth rate. This finding suggests that insiders’ equity shares do have 
an incentive alignment effect and decreases in insider holdings are associated with lower 
long-term investment. In addition, the negative effect becomes stronger for small firms. 




lead to greater influence of individuals. To address the potential endogeneity issue, I 
adopted an instrumental variable approach and obtained the robust results. 
 Taken together, the three essays investigate the antecedents and performance 
consequences of insider equity share sales at the IPO. Specifically, although equity 
ownership can align CEO interest and firm interest, it also creates risks for CEOs. The 
more risks a CEO faces, the more likely the CEO wants to lower the risk. CEOs’ equity 
share sales at the IPO are partially driven by the risks associated with equity ownership. 
In addition, although equity share sales at the IPO by CEOs may be interpreted as a 
negative signal, CEOs are more likely to be able to sell when board members also sell 
their shares. The oversight on CEOs is weakened when board members also sell shares at 
the IPO. Interestingly, although CEOs’ equity share sales at the IPO are usually 
interpreted as a negative signal, I find that when outside directors sell equity shares at the 
IPO, they can bargain for a higher offer price and hence lower underpricing. As a result, 
IPO firms also benefit from insiders’ equity share sales at the IPO. In terms of the post-
IPO performance, I find that insiders’ share sales at the IPO have a negative impact on 
post-IPO R&D growth rate and this impact becomes stronger for small firms. Through 
the instrumental variable approach, I identify a causal relationship between secondary 
share sales at the IPO and post-IPO performance and provide evidence to support the 














CHAPTER 2: ESSAY 1 
 
A BIRD IN YOUR HAND IS WORTH TWO IN THE BUSH: 




I study how CEO’s managerial equity ownership affects CEO’s equity share sale 
behavior at the IPO: and adopt and extend a model of person-pay interaction to study 
how the effect varies with CEO wealth constraint and board members’ share sale at the 
IPO. Using a sample of 651 U.S. software IPOs from 1990 to 2011, I find that CEOs are 
more likely to sell equity shares when the proportion of equity ownership value to their 
cumulative firm interest stake is high, when they are founders, and when board members 
also sell equity shares at the IPO. In addition, the effect of CEO equity ownership value 
proportion on the likelihood of equity share sale at the IPO is larger for founders and 
when board members also sell equity shares at the IPO. The result on CEO founder status 
suggests a wealth constraint effect and the latter result suggests a breakdown of board 
governance. I use VC fund age and non-focal board members’ equity share sales as 
instruments for focal directors’ equity share sales to address potential endogeneity and 












How managerial equity ownership of top executives affects their behaviors has 
long been a research interest for scholars (Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009). 
Although prior studies suggest that managerial equity ownership does affect executive 
actions, the link between managerial equity ownership, executive actions and 
organizational outcomes can be described as weak (Devers, McNamara, Wiseman, and 
Arrfelt, 2008; Wowak and Hambrick, 2010). In addition, managerial equity ownership 
does not invariantly yield beneficial effects envisioned by their proponents and at times 
can yield harmful effects (e.g., Harris and Bromiley, 2007). To explore why managerial 
equity ownership and more generally compensation schemes, often fail to achieve their 
envisioned effects, prior studies, mostly in compensation literature, have adopted a 
contingency perspective to examine the fit between pay design and company strategy 
(Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1990), between pay design and industry characteristics 
(Hoskisson, Hitt, and Hill, 1993), between pay design and administrative systems (Shaw, 
Gupta, and Delery, 2002), and between pay design top executive characteristics (Wowak 
and Hambrick, 2010). The insights of those studies are that managerial equity ownership 
or pay cannot be studied in isolation and that other factors play major roles in influencing 
executive responses to their equity ownership or pay in general. However, prior literature 
largely ignores how CEOs’ firm interest stake structure (the proportion of equity 
ownership value) affects their response to equity shares at the IPO. In addition, prior 
literature also ignored the role that CEO wealth constraint and board governance play in 




investigating how CEO’s firm interest stake structure affects CEO equity share sale 
behavior at the IPO and how CEO wealth constraint and board governance interact with 
CEO’s firm interest stake structure to affect CEO equity share sales at the IPO (see 
Figure 1). 
Founders may be significantly different from non-founders in their wealth 
constraints (e.g., Wasserman, 2012). For example, founders invest more of their personal 
wealth in their firms, and are more willing to sacrifice cash compensation to gain share 
compensation and count on these shares to repay their hard work (Wasserman, 2006). 
These differences presumably affect how founders perceive equity shares they own in the 
firm and, thus, how they respond to them when there is an opportunity to sell. In addition, 
board actions have been suggested to affect executives’ behaviors (Wiseman & Gomez-
Mejia, 1998). For instance, Devers, McNamara, Wiseman and Arrfelt (2008) suggest that 
the reloading and repricing of share options by the board attenuates the risk that CEOs 
would normally bear from high levels of accumulated value of equity-based pay and 
encourage risk taking. Any of these differences associated with founder status and board 
actions could contribute to variation in how executives respond to managerial equity 
ownership, and the efficacy of the response when there is a sale opportunity. Specifically, 
this paper examines CEOs’ equity share sales at the IPO as a response to their equity 
ownership.  
An IPO provides insiders an opportunity to sell equity shares (known as 
secondary shares) along with newly issued shares to the public on the IPO date. By 
selling equity shares at the IPO, CEOs can lower their equity ownership and thus affect 




asymmetry between the firm and public investors (Ritter, 1991). Theories and anecdotal 
evidence suggest that secondary share selling may be interpreted as a negative signal 
since insiders may become less committed to the firm or be pessimistic about the firm’s 
prospect (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Junkunc & Eckhardt, 2009; Leland & Pyle, 1977). 
Nevertheless, in the last twenty-one years in the U.S. software industry, over a quarter of 
CEOs sold their equity shares at their firms’ IPO, which is a significant phenomenon that 
needs study.  
I test my theory with data gathered in 651 U.S. software IPOs from 1990 to 2011. 
I find that CEOs are more likely to sell secondary shares when their proportion of equity 
ownership value to their cumulative firm interest stake is high, when they are founders, 
and when directors sell equity shares at the IPO as well.
1
 The founder result is only 
robust for non-VC-backed IPOs. I adopt an instrumental variable approach to address the 
potential endogeneity that arises from that equity share sales at the IPO may be driven by 
unobservable firm quality and I achieve the robust results.   
This study makes several contributions. First, prior studies largely focus on the 
effect of managerial equity ownership, or more generally CEO compensation, on firm-
level strategic risks such as R&D spending, capital expenditures, and long-term debt (e.g., 
Devers, McNamara, Wiseman & Arrfelt, 2008; Hoskisson et al, 1993; Miller & Bromiley, 
1990). Although insightful, the links between CEO equity ownership and strategic risks 
include multiple intervening factors such as other non-CEO top executives and board 
members, which may confound the effect of managerial equity ownership on individual 
CEOs (Tosi, Werner, Katz & Gomez-Mejia, 2000). In contrast, this study focuses on a 
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CEO’s individual behavior, equity share sale at the IPO, which is a more immediate 
response to his/her equity ownership. In so doing, I provide direct and individual level 
evidence of how CEOs respond to managerial equity ownership, which serves as the 
micro foundation for prior studies on the link between CEO equity ownership and firm-
level outcomes. Without the individual level knowledge, our prior understanding of how 
CEO equity ownership influences organizational outcomes may build on unverified or 
oversimplified assumptions of CEO response to equity ownership.  
Prior research suggests that the effect of CEO equity ownership may be 
contingent on CEO characteristics and needs further study (e.g., Wowak & Hambrick, 
2010). This study contributes to a model of person-pay interaction (Wowak & Hambrick, 
2010) and explores a characteristic of CEO: CEO’s wealth constraint, which is proxied 
by founder status in this study. Founder status is important since founders may have a 
different share of their personal wealth invested in their firms and hence face different 
wealth constraints than non-founders (Wasserman, 2006). Hence, similar managerial 
equity ownership may have varying risk implications for founder CEOs and non-founder 
CEOs. Given that a significant portion of CEOs are founders, especially in high-
technology entrepreneurial firms, it is critical to have a better understanding of how 
wealth constraints influence CEOs’ responses to their ownership shares in the firm. The 
empirical differences I find between founder CEOs’ and non-founder CEOs’ behaviors 
have important implications for executive compensation, upper echelon, and 
entrepreneurship literatures.  
Third, this paper extends a model of person-pay interaction by examining how 




2010). Equity ownership provides an ex ante incentive alignment to CEOs and board 
governance provides oversight (Zajac & Westphal, 1994). Although these two 
governance forces have been studied extensively in prior literature, we know little about 
how the effect of equity ownership on CEOs’ behavior is influenced by board actions. I 
theorize that CEO oversight is weakened when board members themselves sell secondary 
shares, and hence this is correlated with CEO equity share sales at the IPO. Therefore, 
since incentive alignment derived from equity ownership is contingent on board oversight, 
this suggests a model of board-pay interaction in addition to a model of person-pay 
interaction. Empirically, a potential problem is that equity share sales by both directors 
and CEOs may be driven by unobservable firm quality. Thus, selling directors may 
simply be indicative of particularly bad firms – and hence this behavior may be a poor 
indicator of compromised directors. To address this issue I introduce an instrumental 
variable to isolate the effect of director behavior on the probability of CEO equity share 
sales at the IPO and achieved robust results. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
   
A key premise is that individuals prefer sure gains to risky gains. Both behavioral 
and rational models can support this premise, though I draw on behavioral models 
because of their superior empirical support (e.g., Devers, McNamara, Wiseman and 
Arrfelt, 2008; Larraza-Kintana, Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia and Welbourne, 2007; Martin, 
Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, in press). Drawing from prospect theory research, the 




theory. BAM replaces the agent’s risk aversion assumption (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 
1976) with the agent loss aversion (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Risk aversion 
suggests that agents are more sensitive to uncertainty than to either gains or losses. That 
is, a certain amount of value is preferred to uncertain equal amount. In contrast, loss 
aversion implies the motive of avoiding loss, highlighting agents’ desire to protect 
perceived wealth or reverse anticipated losses to wealth even at the expense of accepting 
greater uncertainty or risk (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). One important concept in BAM 
is endowment, which suggests that perceived wealth “in hand” (income in the 
calculations of personal wealth) is valued higher than an equivalent amount of potential 
but uncertain wealth (Martin, Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, in press). Based on the concept 
of endowment and loss aversion, BAM suggests that agents value certain gains more than 
variable gains with the same expected value (Martin, Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, in press; 
Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). 
 With board approval, insiders have an opportunity to sell equity shares at the IPO 
directly to the public, and avoid the uncertainty associated with waiting for a longer time, 
at least a six-month lock-up period. This is often the first such opportunity as prior to the 
IPO, equity shares are generally illiquid (Ritter, 1991). At the IPO, insiders may sell their 
equity shares directly to the public.  
However, an IPO is also a moment when there is severe information asymmetry 
between insiders and investors (Junkunc & Eckhardt, 2009; Ritter, 1991). Theories 
suggest that after insiders reduce their positions in their firms, they may be less 
committed to the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) or be pessimistic about the firm’s 




send a negative signal to the market and put the firm at risk (Ang & Brau, 2003; Gompers 
& Lerner, 2001). The anecdotal evidence that insiders’ equity share sales at the IPO can 
cause a negative market reaction is also widely documented (Draho, 2004). For example, 
Ang and Brau (2003) find that insiders deliberately conceal and confound this adverse 
signal by underreporting the number of equity shares they intend to sell in an IPO. For 
this reason, the board of directors, whose fiduciary duty is to protect shareholders’ 
interests, may prevent insiders from selling shares at the IPO.  
CEO’s Loss Aversion 
 CEO equity ownership can mitigate goal conflicts with shareholders and CEOs 
generally hold substantial amount of equity shares in young and entrepreneurial firms 
(Wasserman, 2006). Shareholders’ ability to diversify generally makes them relatively 
risk neutral and to prefer greater risks to increase potential returns (Eisenhardt, 1989). In 
contrast, CEOs are likely risk-averse since their financial and human capital are tied to 
the fortunes of the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The greater the proportion of a 
CEO’s personal wealth that is invested in the firm, the more risk averse he/she may be.  
This divergence in risk preferences has been a principal concern of research on incentive 
alignment (e.g., Bloom & Milkovich, 1998).  
 While this logic is compelling and sits at the basis of agency theory, the evidence 
in support of relative differences in risk preferences between CEOs and shareholders is 
scant. Alternatively, we can also appeal to the more empirically grounded behavioral 
agency model, or BAM.  
Before a private firm goes public, its equity shares are illiquid and do not have a 




personal wealth is vested in the firm. When a private firm goes public, underwriters will 
estimate a price of its equity shares to determine the offer price (Ritter, 1991). When IPO 
firms have an offer price for its shares, the value of the equity ownership held by a CEO 
is clearer. In practice, usually, a private firm’s equity ownership structure has long been 
determined before even applying for an IPO with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Therefore, it is almost impossible for CEOs to adjust their equity 
ownership after they know about the offer price. According to the concept of endowment 
in BAM, upon receipt, CEOs endow (include) value from an asset in their perceptions of 
personal wealth (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Miller & Shapira, 2004; Peters, 
Slovic, & Gregory, 2003; Thaler & Johnson, 1990). Once a private firm’s equity shares 
receive an offer price, CEOs then use this figure as a reference point and calculate any 
potential gains and losses based on this price (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). 
However, post IPO, the value invested in the equity ownership is vulnerable to loss from 
a decline in the share’s market price. According to BAM, CEOs will reduce their risk 
taking in order to mitigate threats to the personal wealth invested in the shares.  
 This effect is likely to be sensitive to the amount of a CEO’s wealth that is tied up 
in the firm (Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Shavell, 1979; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). 
According to prior literature (e.g., Devers et al., 2008; Garen, 1994), the proportion of 
equity share ownership value to the whole cumulative interest stake the CEO has with the 
firm (hereafter, equity share value proportion) to a large extent indicates how much 
personal wealth of the CEO is exposed to loss and accordingly, the degree of loss 
aversion. While selling equity shares may reduce the CEOs risk exposure, doing so may 




signal associated with the CEO’s equity share sales. If CEOs choose not to sell equity 
shares at IPO, they avoid the negative signal and risks associated with share sales at the 
IPO but their personal wealth invested in the shares remains exposed to possible losses. 
When the proportion of equity shares value is high in the overall interest stake CEOs 
have in the firm, CEOs have more personal wealth exposed to loss and have a higher 
degree of loss aversion and accordingly a higher likelihood of selling some shares at IPO. 
Therefore, I have the following prediction: 
H1: The CEO’s equity share value proportion is positively related to the likelihood of the 
CEO equity share sales at the IPO. 
CEO Wealth Constraint 
  Although I argue that the CEO’s equity share value proportion affects how a 
CEO perceives losses, other factors, such as wealth constraint, may also matter (Wiseman 
& Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Wealth constraint means how badly a CEO needs cash for 
whatever purposes. When a significant proportion of a CEO’s personal wealth is vested 
in the firm and, therefore, there is less outside the firm, the CEO may have a higher need 
for cash and hence a higher wealth constraint. In this paper, I use CEOs’ founder status as 
a proxy for their wealth constraint. Founder CEOs are different from non-founder CEOs 
in two important regards. First, founder CEOs may have more investments in the firm.  
Founders usually invest a large proportion of their personal wealth into the firm, 
providing most of the financing to the firm in its early stage (Prowse, 1998; Wasserman, 
2012; Da Rin, Hellmann & Puri, 2012). For example, in a study on founding teams, 




contributed seed capital early in the life of the startup.
2
 Since pre-IPO equity shares are 
generally illiquid, founders generally lack a good exit opportunity for their investments 
and thus are likely to have a larger portion of their personal wealth concentrated in the 
firm. In contrast, most non-founder CEOs are professional managers and are likely to 
have less personal wealth tied up in the firms, as well as lower ownership stakes 
generally. Thus, we might expect founders to seek to reduce their equity shares and 
withdraw some cash out of the firm at the IPO.  
In addition, founder-CEOs are also suggested to have greater emotional 
attachment to the wealth vested in their equity shares (Wasserman, 2012). Wasserman 
(2012) notes in his book:  
For many founders, the main financial motivation to join a founding team is the 
equity stake rather than the cash compensation. Cash poor startups generally 
cannot pay much salary or bonus, but confident, passionate founders usually 
believe that their equity stakes will eventually repay that sacrifice. For Ockham 
cofounder-CEO Jim Triandiflou, not receiving a salary was an entrepreneur’s 
badge of honor: “April 19 was the first day of Ockham because that’s the first day 
we did not have a paycheck. You’re not getting paid, so you’re now an 
entrepreneur.” 
  
 The emotional attachment founder CEOs have to their equity share may lead them 
to value the wealth vested in the equity share more and have higher loss aversion at the 
IPO since every penny in their equity shares is the reward for their hard work. These 
distinctions between founder CEOs and non-founder CEOs suggest that even having the 
same interest stake in the focal firm, founder CEOs are more loss averse and, thus, are 
more likely to sell equity shares at the IPO than non-founder CEOs. Based on the above 
argument, I have the following prediction: 
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 Part of the reason why some founders self-fund their startups is that they are motivated to retain control of 
their startups, to be able to make all the decisions themselves, and not to have to spend time managing 




H2a: CEO’s founder status is positively related to CEO’s likelihood of equity share sales 
at IPO. 
As argued above, the CEO’s firm interest stake structure affects the CEO’s loss 
aversion and risk bearing (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) and this effect is also 
suggested to be moderated by individual characteristics (Wowak & Hambrick, 2010). 
Although I hypothesize the main effect of founder CEO status on the likelihood of share 
sale, I also expect that CEO founder status moderates the relationship between CEO 
equity share value proportion and their likelihood of share sale at IPO. As suggested, 
founder CEOs may have less personal wealth outside the focal firm than non-founder 
CEOs and therefore the risk bearing and loss aversion may be exacerbated for founder 
CEOs. Confronted with the same proportion of equity share ownership value in the whole 
interest stake in the firm, founder CEOs have higher loss aversion than non-founder 
CEOs. That is, founder CEOs are more sensitive to potential loss. The same increase in 
equity share value proportion means higher concern for loss aversion for founder CEOs 
and accordingly higher likelihood to sell equity shares. In addition, founder CEOs’ power 
in the firm makes it more likely that they can win over the board if the board opposes 
their share sales at the IPO. As a result, for founder CEOs and non-founder CEOs, even if 
they face the same equity share value proportion in their cumulative firm interest stake, 
being founder can enhance the likelihood of their equity share sales at the IPO. Therefore, 
I have the following prediction: 
H2b: The CEO’s founder status positively moderates the relationship between the CEO’s 
equity share value proportion and his/her likelihood of equity share sales at the IPO. 




 As suggested, equity share sales by the CEO at the IPO may send a negative 
signal to the market (Gompers & Lerner, 2001; Ritter, 1991). Both theories and anecdotal 
evidence suggest this line of thinking (Da Rin, Hellmann, & Puri, 2011). Therefore, the 
board of directors, who largely are investors, may oppose the CEOs’ equity share sales at 
the IPO. Board actions have been suggested to be critical in understanding CEO behavior 
(cf. Golden-Biddle & Rao, 1997). One particular board action studied in this paper is if 
board members (excluding the CEO) also engage in equity share sales at the IPO.  
 Before a CEO sells equity shares at the IPO, the CEO needs to discuss the sales 
plan with the board (Ghosh, 2006). Since most board members are investors of the firm 
and hold a significant amount of equity shares, board members may be concerned that the 
CEO will become less committed to the firm after the equity share sales or that such 
equity share sales will depress the firm’s share price. Thus, we might expect the board 
generally to oppose such sales. However, if board members themselves also plan to sell 
part of their equity holdings at the IPO for whatever reason, this action may foster CEO 
equity share sales as well. First, if board members sell shares, this suggests that they may 
not be concerned as much with the negative signal to the market. If this is the case, the 
CEO’s equity share sale may not result in a negative signal either and therefore the 
CEO’s equity share sale may not be strongly opposed by the board. Board members’ 
equity share sale may indicate a friendly environment within the firm towards all other 
insiders’ equity share sales including the CEO. On the other hand, if board members sell 
equity shares but are still concerned about the negative signal, they may still oppose the 
CEO’s equity share sales and try to save the privilege for themselves. Specifically, board 




share sales. However, they may be unable or ineffective in their efforts to prevent the 
CEO from selling even if they do not want the CEO to sell shares. Since the board’s 
oversight on the CEOs is essentially a bargaining between the two sides (Daily, Dalton & 
Cannella, 2003), when board members sell equity shares at the IPO, they are morally less 
powerful and thus have a disadvantageous position in bargaining with the CEO when 
CEOs plan to sell equity shares as well. In this case, the low bargaining power of the 
board makes the CEO’s equity share sales more likely. Overall, when board members 
also sell equity shares at the IPO, the CEO is more likely to sell equity shares. Based on 
the above argument, I have the following prediction: 
H3a: The Directors’ equity share sales at the IPO are positively related to the likelihood 
of the CEO’s equity share sales at the IPO. 
 The moderating effect of board actions on the effect of CEO compensation on 
CEO behavior has been documented in prior studies (Devers et al., 2008). Following and 
extending prior literature, this paper also predicts a moderating effect of equity share 
sales by board members on the relationship between CEO equity share value proportion 
and the likelihood of CEO equity share sales at the IPO. As hypothesized, CEOs are 
driven by loss aversion to sell part of their equity shares at the IPO. However, even 
though CEOs have the motivation to sell, whether they can successfully sell shares 
largely depends on the approval of the board. As suggested, when the board members 
also plan to sell part of their equity shares at the IPO, on the one hand, the board may 
have less concern for the negative signal; on the other hand, the board may be less 
effective in preventing the CEO from doing the same thing. Therefore, given the same 




the board members also engage in equity share sales at the IPO, the CEOs may have 
higher bargaining power over the board and hence are more likely to be able to sell equity 
shares successfully. I have the following prediction: 
H3b: The Directors’ equity share sales positively moderate the relationship between the 





 My sample includes 651 U.S. IPOs issued from 1990 to 2011 in three sectors of 
the computer software industry: computer programming services (SIC 7371), computer 
software (SIC 7372), and computer integrated systems design (SIC 7373). I constructed 
the sample of IPO firms from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Global New Issues 
database. Following prior research (Chen, Hambrick & Pollock, 2008; Pollock & 
Rindova, 2003; Ritter, 1991), I exclude any spin-off or equity carve-out IPOs to ensure 
that the sample firms were only independent entrepreneurial firms. I also excluded 
foreign firms issuing shares in the U.S. market. Firm characteristics, pre-IPO financial 
data, IPO-related data and upper echelons biographical data were drawn from IPO firms’ 
prospectuses (424B form), SDC, and COMPUSTAT database. These prospectuses are 
available from the SEC Edgar online service and ThomsonONE database. VC-related 





 The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the IPO 
firm’s CEO sells equity shares at the IPO and zero otherwise. Alternatively, I also 
measure the percentage of equity shares the CEO sold relative to his/her own equity 
holdings of the focal IPO firm. I identify who the CEO is from the “Management” section 
of the IPO prospectus and if and how many equity shares the CEO sells at the IPO from 
the “Principal and Selling Shareholders” section. Other related CEO information is also 
identified in the prospectuses.  
Independent Variables 
  Proportion of equity share value to the CEO’s whole cumulative interest stake 
with the firm. This variable is constructed as follows: 
                                                                  
                                                                                                 
. 
The variable measures the proportion of a CEO’s wealth invested in his or her firm’s 
equity shares to the CEO’s whole cumulative interest stake in the firm since the CEO 
joined the firm. The higher the value, the higher the proportion of the CEO’s interest state 
with the firm exposed to uncertainty.   
CEO wealth constraint. CEO wealth constraint is measured by founder status and 
it is a dummy variable that is coded as 1 if the CEO is also a founder of the firm; 0 
otherwise. Founder information was collected from the IPO firms’ prospectuses. As 
argued above, founder CEOs may have less personal wealth outside their firm and hence 
have a higher need for cash and wealth constraint.  
Board member equity share sale action. A dummy variable is used to indicate if 




coded as 1 if any board member sells equity share at the IPO; 0 otherwise. The data come 
from the IPO firms’ prospectuses.  
Control Variables 
 CEO characteristics. I include the following individual CEO characteristics in 
my analysis to control for possible effects on the individual level: (1) Age. The CEO’s 
age may affect his/her likelihood of equity share sales at the IPO. The CEOs at different 
ages may have different needs for cash, which may affect their equity share sale decision. 
(2) Prior entrepreneurial experience. This variable is coded as 1 if a CEO founded other 
firms (at least one) prior to joining or founding the focal firm, 0 otherwise. Founder 
experience may capture the CEOs’ risk preference, experience and wealth situation, 
which may in turn affect the CEOs’ decision of equity share sale at the IPO (Fairlie, 
2002). (3) Annual cash compensation. To control for the wealth effect, I also include 
annual cash compensation. Specifically, annual cash compensation includes annual salary, 
bonus, and other annual cash compensation. (4) Chairman of the board of directors. I use 
a dummy variable to indicate if the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors. 
Being the chairman of the board may give the CEOs power to influence board decisions 
including equity share sale at the IPO. (5) Firm tenure. The CEO firm tenure refers to the 
number of years since the CEO joined or founded the firm. (6) The CEO equity share 
ownership percentage prior to the IPO. The CEO equity share ownership percentage 
variable is calculated as the percentage of common shares relative to the whole firm held 
by a CEO prior to the IPO. The CEO equity share ownership percentage prior to IPO 




percentage of equity shares are suggested to have more power within the firm and be able 
to influence important decision making (Finkelstein, 1992).   
Board characteristics. In my analysis I control for the following board 
characteristics. (1) Size of the board. Size of the board may indicate monitoring strength 
of the board. The bigger the board is, the stronger the board monitoring is. Specifically, I 
control for the number of non-CEO board members in my regression. (2) Inside director 
proportion. An inside director is a director who is also a firm officer (Johnson, Hoskisson, 
& Hitt, 1993; Seward & Walsh, 1996). Prior studies suggest that inside directors may be 
less effective in monitoring CEOs since they work under CEOs and their career prospects 
are significantly affected by CEOs. I divide the number of inside directors by the total 
number of directors to obtain the inside director proportion. I exclude the CEO from the 
calculation when the CEO was also a director of the firm.  
Firm characteristics. Firm size-related variables such as the log value of total 
assets one year prior to the IPO, the log value of sales prior to the IPO and the log value 
of sales one year post-IPO are included in the regression to control for firm size effects 
and firm quality (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998). In addition, I include the firm’s age.  
 IPO characteristics. To control for IPO-related factors, I include the following 
variables: (1) Log value of the IPO proceeds. This variable measures the size of the IPO. 
(2) Offer price/book value measures how profitable the share sale is at the IPO. 
Presumably, the higher the ratio, the more profitable the share sale is. This profitability 
may affect the CEOs’ share sales. (3) Number of the IPOs in the whole market in the 3 
months preceding the focal IPO. This variable is used to measure the “hotness” of the 




which can potentially affect a CEO’s expectation about the market and their share sale 
decision. (4) Number of IPOs in computer software industry in the 3 months preceding 
the focal IPO. Although I control for the number of IPOs in the entire market to measure 
the hotness of the market, the IPO market for software industry could be driven by some 
industry-specific factors. That is, the computer software industry could face a cold market 
when the IPO market is hot for other industries or vice versa. To control more accurately 
for the hotness of the IPO market for software industry, I control for the number of 
computer software industry IPOs in the 3 months preceding the focal IPO.   
  Underwriter prestige.  Underwriters are important players during the IPO process 
(Carter & Manaster, 1990). Underwriter prestige data can be constructed in the spirit of 
the methodology of Cater and Manaster (1990) and are available online at 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. The online data are constructed by Jay 
Ritter and extensively used in the finance literature (e.g. Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, 2003; 
Loughran & Ritter, 2004). 
VC. The variable of VC is a dummy variable that indicates if the IPO firm is 
backed by any venture capital firm. The variable is coded as 1 if the IPO firm is backed 
by a venture capital firm; 0 otherwise.  The data were drawn from the SDC database and I 
collected the relevant information from IPO firms’ prospectuses and VentureXpert 
database to validate the SDC data.  
Year period dummy. Because my sample includes IPOs covering 1990-2011, I 
create year period dummies to control for possible year effects. According to prior studies 




periods 1990-1998, 1999-2000, and post-2000, respectively. In my analysis, I create three 
dummy variables to indicate these time periods.  
Method of Analysis 
 Because the dependent variable is a dummy variable, a Probit model is 
appropriate. The unit of analysis is the IPO. The results are robust to a logit model. In 
another robustness check, I use Tobit regression to predict the percent of equity shares 
sold by the CEO relative to the CEO’s own holding of their firm and report results in 
Table 2. In addition, I adopt an instrumental variable approach to address possible 




Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables. 26% of 
sample CEOs engage in share sales at the IPO. 87% of the dollar value of CEOs’ whole 
cumulative interest stake with the firm is concentrated in the focal firms’ equity shares. 
44% of the CEOs in the sample are also founders of their firm. 34% of the sample firms 
have at least one non-CEO director who sells equity share at the IPO. 65% of the sample 
firms are backed by VCs. Sample firms have an average age of 8.3 years. On average, 
CEOs have been with their firms for 6.12 years. Specifically, founder CEOs have a firm 
tenure of 8.25 years and non-founder CEOs 4.47 years. We can see that the sample firms 
are largely entrepreneurial firms. The likelihood of CEOs’ equity share sale has a 
correlation of .21 with CEO founder status and .52 with non-CEO director equity share 





Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Table 2 presents the results of a Probit and Tobit regression analysis predicting 
the likelihood and percentage of CEO’s equity share sale at the IPO. Marginal effects are 
reported in Probit models in Table 2. Model 1 includes control variables as a baseline 
model. Model 2 includes CEO equity share value proportion and the coefficient is 
positive and significant (β=.52; p< .01), suggesting that when the proportion of equity 
share value in the CEO’s whole cumulative interest stake with the firm is high, the CEO 
is more likely to engage in equity share sales at the IPO and consistent with H1. CEO 
equity share value proportion is a measure of the degree of uncertainty associated with 
CEO cumulative interest stake in the firm. The finding suggests that the higher the equity 
share value proportion, the higher the uncertainty and CEO lass aversion and the higher 
the likelihood of equity share sale at the IPO. In Model 2, I include CEO founder status 
and find it positive and significant (β= .11; p< .01), suggesting that compared with non-
founder CEOs, founder CEOs are more likely to sell equity shares at the IPO. If I assume 
that CEO founder status is able to measure wealth constraint well, the finding implies that 
founder CEOs may invest much of their personal wealth into the focal firm, have less 
personal wealth outside the firm and hence really have a high need for cash. This finding 
supports my H2a. In Model 2 the coefficient on board action of equity share sale dummy 
is positive and significant (β=.32; p< .001), suggesting that when board members sell 
equity shares at IPO, CEOs are more likely to sell equity shares as well. As argued, 
directors’ equity sale indicates a weakened oversight on the CEO. When the oversight on 
the CEO becomes weak, the CEO is more likely to sell some equity shares at the IPO to 




can be founder when I use the percentage of equity shares sold by the CEO as my 
dependent variable in Model 5 Table 2.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
To test interaction hypotheses 2b and 3b, I include interaction terms in Model 3. 
To reduce multicollinearity, I mean-center CEO equity share value proportion, CEO 
founder status, and board action of equity share sale dummy before creating the 
interaction terms. From Table 2, we can see that none of the interaction terms are 
significant in Model 3. Since I adopt a Probit model to test my hypotheses, the 
interpretation of the interaction terms can not only be based on the significance level of 
the estimated coefficients in the table reported. To test more accurately and interpret the 
interaction terms in a Probit estimator, I adopt a simulation-based approach (King, Tomz 
& Wittenberg, 2000; Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Zelner, 2009). The advantage of this 
simulation-based approach is that it displays the relationship and significance level over 
the full range of the independent variable rather than only a single point. With this 
approach, I can see over which range the relationship is significant and over which it is 
not. Based on this approach, I report the interaction graph of CEO equity value 
proportion and founder status in Figure 2. In Figure 2, x-axis is my independent variable 
CEO equity share value proportion and y-axis is the change of likelihood of CEO’s 
equity share sale at the IPO when the CEO founder status turns from zero to one. From 
Figure 2, we can see that the interaction is significant at 95% level over most of the range 
of CEO equity share value proportion. The vertical red dotted lines from left to right 
indicate the mean minus two standard deviations, mean minus one standard deviation, 




the line is significantly above zero, suggesting that the likelihood of founder CEO’s 
equity share sale is higher than that of non-founder CEO. In addition, this part of the line 
has positive slope, suggesting that with the increase of CEO equity share value proportion, 
founder CEOs have an increasingly higher likelihood of selling equity shares at IPO than 
non-founder CEOs. Therefore, the positive-slope part of the line supports my H2b, 
suggesting a positive moderating effect of CEO founder status on the relationship 
between CEO equity share value proportion and the likelihood of equity share sale at the 
IPO. More interestingly, the negative-slope part of the line is not consistent with H2b. 
The negative-slope part is still above zero, suggesting that founder CEOs are still more 
likely to sell equity shares at IPO than non-founder CEOs at each corresponding level of 
CEO equity share value proportion. The negative slope suggests that with the increase of 
CEO equity share value proportion, the difference between founder CEOs and non-
founder CEOs’ likelihood of equity share sales at the IPO is decreasing, implying that at 
high levels of CEO equity share value proportion, founder CEOs behave more and more 
like non-founder CEOs. This negative-slope part may suggest that founder CEOs on this 
part may have plenty of personal wealth outside the firm or they are more committed to 
the firm and hence do not want to sell equity shares at the IPO.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
To test H3b, I adopt the same approach as above and report the graph in Figure 3. 
Similarly, y-axis displays the change of likelihood of CEO equity share sale at the IPO 
when director equity share sale dummy turns from zero to one. The line in Figure 3 is 
significant over most of the range of CEO equity share value proportion. The significant 




the IPO is significantly higher when directors also sell shares than when no directors sell. 
In addition, the line has a positive slope, suggesting that with the increase of CEO equity 
share value proportion, the difference between the likelihood of CEO equity share sale at 
the IPO is becoming increasingly large when directors sell shares versus not sell. This 
finding supports H3b, implying that directors’ equity share sale action positively 
moderates the relationship between CEO equity share value proportion and the likelihood 
of equity share sales at the IPO.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
Although I controlled for factors that may affect CEOs’ share sale at the IPO as 
much as possible, it is still possible that some firm-specific unobservable factors affect 
insider share sales at the IPO. For example, firm-related variables such as total assets, 
sales and firm age may not completely capture firm quality and therefore, firm quality 
may be unobservable to researchers but it could significantly affect CEOs and board 
members’ decisions to sell shares. CEOs and directors of poor quality firms are more 
likely to sell shares at the IPO and vice versa. If this is the case, firm quality is an omitted 
variable and is contained in the error term of the regression, causing the correlation 
between board action of share sale and the error term. That is, the above results may omit 
unobservable firm quality and thus suffer from endogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002) and the 
real driver of CEO share sale at IPO may be the unobservable firm quality rather than 
board members’ share sale at IPO.  
To address this possible endogeneity issue, I adopt two approaches. First, I tried 
to control for expected firm quality or insiders’ private information about firm quality. 




regress on sales one-year post-IPO and then use the predicted value of sales one-year 
post-IPO as a proxy for private information of future firm quality. I employ the predicted 
value of sales one-year post-IPO as a control variable and obtain the same results as in 
Table 2 (results not reported here). Alternatively, I use the real sales one-year post-IPO as 
a control variable in Table 2 to predict the likelihood of CEO share sale at the IPO. All 
the significant results in Table 2 remain significant in either way.  
Second, I adopt an instrumental variable approach. In this study, a good 
instrumental variable must be (1) correlated with board members’ share sale at the IPO 
and (2) not correlated with the error term of the regression or should not be controlled for 
as a direct explanatory variable of dependent variable. To find appropriate instrumental 
variables, I split my sample into VC-backed firms and non-VC-backed firms. VC fund 
age may serve as a good instrumental variable for directors’ share sale at the IPO for VC-
backed firms. According to prior studies (e.g., Gompers & Lerner, 2001), VC funds 
usually enter their exit period 7 to 8 years after their founding. In the first 7 or 8 years, 
VC funds actively make investments and build up the firms and after that they actively 
seek to exit their investment and distribute cash back to their limited partner investors 
(Da Rin, Hellmann & Puri, 2012). Therefore, compared with VC funds younger than 7 or 
8 years, older VC funds have higher motivations to exit their investments. This may serve 
as a good instrumental variable since the pressure that old VC funds have is correlated 
with VC’s share sale at the IPO but has little to do with the quality of the IPO firm. The 
doubt comes that if the VC fund anticipates its exit by selling equity shares at the IPO 
and may reduce its value-adding activities to the focal firms, VC fund age is then 




Draho, 2004) suggest that the IPO market has high volatility and it may only take a few 
months for a hot market to change into a cold market. It depends on market condition if 
any insiders are allowed by underwriters to sell secondary shares at the IPO (Draho, 
2004). Therefore, even if old VC funds plan to sell shares at the IPO, they are not sure if 
the market condition allows them to do so, which means VC funds would not  reduce 
their value-adding activities to the focal the IPO firms even if they plan to sell shares at 
the IPO. In addition, prior studies (e.g., Da Rin, Hellmann & Puri, 2012; Gompers & 
Lerner, 2001) suggest that VC firms usually hold substantial shares post-IPO, at least 
within one year, even if they sell part of their shares at the IPO. As a result, a large part of 
VCs’ interest is still vested in the focal IPO firm post-IPO, VC firms would not reduce 
value-adding activities prior to the IPO. Note that although more experienced or older VC 
firms may be able to choose higher quality investments, VC experience effect is a firm-
level variable rather than a fund-level factor. Many VC firms have multiple, simultaneous 
VC funds of different ages (Da Rin, Hellmann & Puri, 2012). Different aged VC funds do 
not have different levels of experience since they belong to the same VC firm. That is, 
VC firm age as a proxy of experience may be correlated with the quality of the 
investment but VC fund age is not. 
In my sample, there are 427 VC-backed firms (66%) out of 651 firms. In these 
427 VC-backed firms, there are 348 unique VC firms, 868 unique VC funds, and 1,120 
VC investments. To test if VC funds older than 8 years are more likely to sell shares at 
IPO, I create a dummy variable to indicate if a VC fund is older than 8 years and younger 
than 15 years
3
 and use this dummy variable to predict the likelihood of its share sales at 
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 1,012 out of 1.120 (90.36%) VC funds are younger than 15 years. 236 (21.07%) VC funds are between 8 




the IPO on the VC fund level. After controlling for VC firm age, the IPO firm fixed 
effect, and VC firm fixed effect, the dummy variable is significant in predicting VC 
fund’s likelihood of share sales at IPO (results not reported here). To instrument for 
directors’ share sales at IPO on the firm level, I constructed a variable: the number of VC 
funds aged between 8 and 15 each IPO firm has. Since on the fund level, the VC funds 
aged between 8 and 15 are more likely to sell shares at the IPO, it is reasonable to expect 
the more VC funds aged between 8 and 15 an IPO firm has, the more likely these VC 
funds will sell shares at the IPO and, therefore, the more likely I observe directors’ share 
sales
4
. I test the correlation between the number of VC funds aged between 8 and 15 and 
the likelihood of directors’ share sales at the IPO for VC-backed firms (r=.2; p<.001). In 
addition, the number of VC funds aged between 8 and 15 each IPO firm does not 
significantly in predict the dependent variable: the likelihood of the CEO’s share sale at 
the IPO in the sample of VC-backed firm. Therefore it qualifies as an instrumental 
variable. As suggested, VC funds aged between 8 and 15 are more likely to sell shares 
and partially exit at the IPO due to exit pressure, which is unrelated to the IPO firm 
quality. In addition, I create another instrumental variable by constructing the number of 
IPOs whose VC funds aged between 8 and 15 years and sold shares at IPO in the 3 
months preceding the focal IPO to instrument for directors’ share sale dummy. 
Presumably, following a social comparison logic, the more VC funds aged between 8 and 
15 years who sold shares at the IPO partially to exit their investment in the 3 months 
prior to the focal firm, the more legitimate it will be for focal directors to do the same 
thing. In addition, the share sales at the IPO of other firms’ VC funds have little to do 
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with the focal firm’s quality. Therefore, theoretically, the number of IPOs whose VC 
funds aged between 8 and 15 who sold shares at the IPO in the 3 months preceding the 
focal IPO could serve as an instrumental variable for the directors’ share sale of the focal 
firm. Empirically, this number is significantly correlated with focal directors’ share sale 
at the IPO for the VC-backed firms (r=.24; p< .001) and for the full sample (r=.16; 
p< .001) and does not significantly predict the dependent variable: the likelihood of focal 
CEO’s share sales at the IPO neither in VC-backed firms nor in full sample. Because my 
dependent variable and endogenous variable are both dummy variables, I adopted a 
treatment-effect model based on maximum likelihood estimation and report the results in 
Table 3.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
In Table 3, Models 1 through 3 are for VC-backed sample and Models 4 through 
6 are for non-VC-backed sample. In all the first stage models (Models 1 and 4), the 
dependent variable is the endogenous variable: directors’ equity share sale dummy. The 
dependent variable in all the second stage models (Models 2 and 5) is CEOs’ equity share 
sale dummy. In Models 1, I use the number of VC funds aged 8-15 (β=.5; p< .001) and 
the number of IPOs whose VC funds aged 8-15 and sold shares at IPO in 3 months 
preceding the focal IPO (β=.28; p< .001) to instrument for focal firm’s directors’ equity 
share sale and find them significant. Accordingly, directors’ share sale dummy is 
significant (β=.26; p< .001) in the second stage Model 2. In Model 3, I report results from 
a Probit estimator for comparison and directors’ share sale dummy is significant in both 
models. Although CEO equity share value proportion is not significant in Model 3, it is 




or 3 and I discuss the possible reasons in the discussion section. For non-VC-backed 
sample, I did the similar analysis. Model 4 is the first stage and my instrument variable is 
significant (β=.18; p< .01). In Model 5, the director equity share sale variable is positive 
and significant (β=.58; p< .001). Model 6 is the results from a Probit estimator. As you 
can see, Model 5 and Model 6 are very similar, supporting the robustness of the results.   
Overall, above results provide evidence to support my hypotheses although some 
hypotheses only hold for a certain subgroup. Specifically, Hypothesis 1, which states that 
the proportion of equity share value to CEO whole cumulative interest stake in the firm is 
positively related to the likelihood CEO equity share sale at the IPO, is supported. This 
finding suggests that CEOs are more likely to sell equity shares when they have high 
concerns for loss aversion. It also predicts the percent of shares sold, i.e, the degree of 
share sales. Hypothesis 2a, states that founder CEOs are more likely to sell shares at the 
IPO and is supported. Further analysis finds that this result only holds for non VC-backed 
firms and as such the results in Table 2 are largely driven by non VC-backed firms. These 
results may suggest that founders in VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms have 
significantly different amounts of personal wealth outside the focal firm. Founder CEOs 
in VC-backed firms have more personal wealth outside the focal firms and hence have 
less wealth constraints than founder CEOs in non-VC-backed firms. Or alternatively, 
non-VC directors exert weaker oversight on founder CEOs, which makes it more likely 
for founder CEOs to be able to sell equity shares at the IPO. In contrast, VCs can impose 
stronger oversight on CEOs and CEO’s founder status does not render them privilege. 
Both explanations are feasible and because of the data constraint, I cannot tease them 




Hypothesis 2b, which states a positive moderating effect of CEO founder status 
on the relationship between CEO equity share value proportion and the likelihood of 
CEO equity share sale at the IPO, provides further support. Hypothesis 2b is only 
significant for some range of CEO equity share value proportion. As suggested, the 
negative-slope part of Figure 2 implies that founders behave more like non-founders 
when their equity share value proportion is high. This may suggest that those founders 
have more personal wealth outside the focal firm and hence do not have wealth 
constraints as much. Or they have stewardship toward the focal firms and hence do not 
want to sell equity shares for the fear of the negative signal. This is not theorized in this 
study but deserves more investigation in the future.  
Hypothesis 3a, which states that the directors’ equity share sale at the IPO is 
positively associated with the CEOs’ equity share sale, is significant across both samples, 
VC-backed firms and non VC-backed firms. When directors also sell equity shares at the 
IPO, the oversight from the board becomes weaker and therefore CEOs have a higher 
likelihood to sell equity shares as well.  Also, directors may not concern the negative 
signal associated with CEO equity share sale at the IPO. Hypothesis 3b, stating a positive 
moderating effect of directors’ equity share sale at the IPO on the relationship between 
CEO equity share value proportion and the likelihood of CEOs’ equity share sale at the 
IPO, is supported. This result suggests that when CEOs have the same proportion of 
equity share value, CEOs whose directors sell equity shares have a higher bargaining 
power and hence a higher likelihood of selling equity shares at the IPO. Overall, these 





DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
  
Prior studies on managerial equity ownership, mostly in compensation literature, 
have focused on the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance 
or strategic risk taking such as R&D expenditure, long-term debt, and mergers and 
acquisitions (e.g., Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Devers et al., 2008; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1988). However, the link between managerial equity ownership and firm 
performance or strategic risk taking is not direct, is of unclear timing, and is subject to the 
influence of numerous external forces (Tosi, Werner, Katz & Gomez-Mejia, 2000). Prior 
studies suggest that researchers are more likely to be able to observe the influence of 
managerial equity ownership by focusing on more proximal outcomes associated with 
equity holding, rather than on distal outcomes such as performance and strategic risk 
taking (Devers et al., 2008). In addition, prior studies have not considered the role of 
active risk management by agents (Martin, Gomez-Jejia, & Wiseman, in press). An 
implicit assumption in prior research is that the agent is passive and does not have the 
ability to manage actively the risk exposure to their equity share ownership (Martin, 
Gomez-Jejia, & Wiseman, in press). In this study, I examined the influence of CEO 
managerial equity holding on a proximal and individual level behavior: CEO equity share 
sale at the IPO. Direct examination of such a proximal and active risk management 
behavior of CEOs helps provide a better understanding of the effect of CEO managerial 
equity ownership, which provides a micro-foundation for studies on higher levels such as 
strategic risk taking and firm performance. 
My findings elucidate the influence of CEO managerial equity ownership, CEO 




(1) the proportion of equity share value in the CEO’s whole cumulative interest stake 
with the firm is positively associated with the likelihood of the CEO equity share sale at 
the IPO; (2) founder CEOs are more likely to sell shares, and the above relationship in (1) 
is stronger when the CEO is a founder; (3) board members’ share sale is positively 
associated with CEO share sale, and the above relationship in (1) is stronger when board 
members also sell shares at the IPO. This paper makes contributions to the literature in 
several ways. 
First, although BAM suggests that compensation mix affects how a CEO frames a 
problem and in turn his or her risk bearing and risk taking behavior, prior studies have 
not examined how the allocation between cash and share compensation affects CEO risk 
bearing and loss aversion. Although the calculation of CEO equity share value proportion 
includes equity shares that not only come from compensation, the findings have 
significant implication for share compensation. This paper contributes to BAM by 
demonstrating that the proportion of equity share ownership value in CEO’s whole 
cumulative interest stake with the firm affects CEO risk bearing and loss aversion. The 
higher the proportion of share ownership value, the more concerns for loss aversion 
CEOs have and the more likely CEOs are to sell part of their equity shares to avoid 
possible losses due to later share price fluctuation. My finding provides evidence that 
CEOs are loss averse and the loss aversion is affected by wealth constraints. This finding 
supports the loss aversion argument proposed by BAM and extends BAM by suggesting 
that the proportion of share ownership value in the CEO’s whole cumulative interest 




  Second, this paper contributes to a model of person-pay interaction by 
incorporating CEO founder status into consideration. Although a model of person-pay 
interaction provides insights on the contingencies under which pay effect varies, it 
ignores how personal wealth constraint influences the effect of pay on executives. 
Founder status is a proxy for wealth constraint. Founders usually have a higher 
percentage of personal wealth vested in the focal firm. The same equity share value 
proportion can have different effects on CEOs who have different percentages of personal 
wealth invested in the focal firm. This paper suggests that the CEO’s founder status 
strengthens the relationship between the proportion of equity share value and the 
likelihood of CEO share sale at the IPO. As suggested, founders usually provide a 
significant proportion of financing to their firm in the early stage and do not have a good 
opportunity to exit until the IPO (Prowse, 1998; Wasserman, 2012). Compared with non-
founder CEOs, founder CEOs may have less personal wealth outside the focal firm due to 
the above reasons. Therefore, the same equity share value proportion means more 
concerns of loss aversion for founder CEOs. In addition, founders largely prefer equity 
share ownership to cash and count on the equity share ownership to repay their hard work 
for the firm (Wasserman, 2012). Founder CEOs are also suggested to have more 
emotional attachment to share ownership, which can increase their loss aversion and, in 
turn, the likelihood of selling equity shares at the IPO. In addition, this finding also 
contributes to BAM. BAM suggests performance history, board monitoring, and 
performance target difficulty are macro-level factors that affect the agents’ risk bearing 
and loss aversion; it gives inadequate attention to agents’ differences at the individual 




as wealth constraint affects risk bearing and loss aversion, which is ignored in the 
original BAM formulation.  
 My findings on CEO founder status suggest that in non-VC-backed firms, the 
main effect of CEO founder status is significant, which means founder CEOs are more 
likely to sell equity shares at the IPO. In my argument, founder status may capture two 
characteristics: less personal wealth outside the focal firm and founder privilege. I find 
that the main effect of founder status is only significant in non-VC-backed firms. I offer 
two possible explanations for this finding. One is that founders in VC-backed firms may 
have more personal wealth outside the focal firm than founders in non-VC-backed firms 
and, thus, have lower loss aversion. Therefore, the difference between founder CEOs and 
non-founder CEOs in VC-backed firms does not make a difference to their likelihood of 
share sales. The other explanation is that VC directors are more vigilant at monitoring. It 
is possible that VC’s fiduciary responsibility to their limited partners provides additional 
incentives to monitor CEOs so that even founder CEOs do not have privilege when it 
comes to share sales at the IPO. While I cannot distinguish between these theories, to the 
best of my knowledge, this heterogeneity of founders has not been noted in the literature.   
  Third, the impact of board equity share sale at the IPO on the likelihood of CEOs’ 
equity share sale is significant across both VC-backed firms and non VC-backed firms. 
As suggested, when board members sell equity shares at the IPO, they are either not 
concerned with the negative signal or less effective in preventing the CEO from doing the 
same thing, and therefore CEOs are more likely to sell equity shares at the IPO. Although 
board action is suggested to affect CEO risk behavior (Devers et al., 2008), share sale 




found to affect significantly the CEO’s share sale behavior at the IPO. It is possible that 
this phenomenon is driven by unobservable firm quality. Specifically, it may be that 
board members and CEO’s share sale at the IPO are both driven by private firm quality 
information and therefore it is not the board members’ share sale but instead the firm 
quality that causes the CEO’s share sale. To address this possibility, I adopt an 
instrumental variable approach and use VC fund age and non-focal VCs’ equity share 
sales to instrument for board members’ share sale (see Tables 3). Board members’ equity 
share sale at the IPO remains significant in the instrumental variable analysis, which 
provides support for the argument that board members’ equity share sale causes the 
CEO’s equity share sale at the IPO. When board members need to sell equity shares at 
the IPO, they either do not monitor the CEO’s equity share sale or their oversight on the 
CEO becomes weak. The instrumental variable analysis suggests that VC funds sell 
equity shares at the IPO due to exit pressure, which is unrelated to firm quality. I find that 
the results follow a similar pattern for non-VC-backed firms and cautiously suggest that 
board members’ equity share sale at the IPO is largely driven by reasons unrelated to firm 
quality. These findings suggest a causal relationship between the board members’ equity 
share sale and the CEO equity share sale, extending prior research on the effect of board 
actions on CEO risk behavior by identifying the importance of board members’ equity 
share sale behavior at the IPO (e.g., Devers et al., 2008). These findings contribute to a 
model of person-pay interaction by suggesting that the effect of pay on executives may be 
significantly contingent on board governance, indicating that when board oversight 
weakens, managerial behavior driven by loss aversion derived from managerial equity 




behavior may not be consistent with shareholders’ interest, the above finding suggests 
that the incentive alignment effect of managerial equity share ownership partially 
depends on board governance. Although some prior studies suggest a substitute 
relationship between board governance and incentive alignment such as managerial 
equity share ownership (e.g., Beatty & Zajac, 1994), this paper suggests a more complex 
relationship between board governance and managerial equity share ownership. Namely, 
in some cases these two governance forces complement each other. It is important for 
future research to identify conditions under which board governance and managerial 
equity share incentive alignment work as substitution or complement.      
 This study has a number of limitations. The first is the nature of the measure of 
CEO founder status. As in prior studies in the literature, I do not have comprehensive 
measures of CEO wealth. Hence I am unable to distinguish completely the loss aversion 
and CEOs’ privilege derived from their founder status. Although I controlled other 
related factors as much as possible and advanced the methods of prior studies by splitting 
my sample into VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms, it would be ideal if future research 
can collect detailed information on CEO personal wealth and identify research contexts 
able to tease apart loss aversion and founder privilege. Second, this study only focuses on 
the computer software industry. Future studies may include other industries to test the 
generalizability of the results. The arguments made in this study are believed to hold for 
other industries, and it is hoped future research will be able to confirm these results 
empirically across new empirical settings.  
  To conclude, by using 651 U.S. software IPOs from 1990 to 2011, I find that the 




is positively associated with the likelihood of CEO equity share sale at the IPO and this 
relationship is enhanced when the CEO is a founder and when board members also sell 
equity shares at the IPO. In addition, founder CEOs are more likely to sell shares at the 





Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 Likelihood of CEO stock sale at IPO 0.26 0.44 1.00
2 CEO stock value proportion 0.87 0.15 0.03 1.00
3 CEO founder status 0.44 0.50 0.21 0.11 1.00
4 Director stock sale dummy 0.34 0.47 0.52 -0.08 0.05 1.00
5 Chairman 0.52 0.50 0.11 0.11 0.31 0.02 1.00
6 CEO firm tenure 6.12 4.76 0.30 -0.28 0.39 0.19 0.24 1.00
7 CEO age 45.37 7.48 -0.03 -0.22 -0.15 0.02 0.02 0.12 1.00
8 CEO annual cash compensation 0.31 0.37 0.15 -0.34 0.06 0.11 0.03 0.28 0.14 1.00
9 Prior entrepreneurial experience 0.16 0.37 0.01 0.09 0.15 -0.06 0.09 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 1.00
10 CEO pre-IPO stock ownership 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.34 0.03 0.32 0.42 -0.04 0.01 0.09 1.00
11 Board size 6.03 1.65 -0.09 -0.02 -0.12 0.01 0.00 -0.15 0.07 0.12 0.03 -0.34 1.00
12 Inside director proportion 0.33 0.19 0.13 0.06 0.16 0.03 0.08 0.22 -0.01 -0.11 0.02 0.45 -0.44 1.00
13 Pre-IPO total assets (log) 2.56 1.33 0.09 -0.06 0.03 0.14 0.01 0.22 0.10 0.37 -0.01 -0.15 0.30 -0.28 1.00
14 Pre-IPO  sales (log) 2.74 1.30 0.22 -0.20 0.01 0.27 0.05 0.39 0.13 0.41 -0.07 0.00 0.17 -0.11 0.77 1.00
15 Firm age 8.30 5.58 0.19 -0.33 -0.04 0.20 0.10 0.60 0.22 0.22 -0.12 0.16 -0.03 0.10 0.28 0.47 1.00
16 Post-IPO sales (log) 3.69 1.21 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.16 -0.01 0.17 -0.01 0.28 -0.02 -0.09 0.21 -0.20 0.71 0.75 0.22 1.00
17 Offer price/book value 7.17 0.31 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.04 1.00
18 IPO proceeds (log) 3.44 0.85 0.07 0.22 0.00 0.11 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.28 0.02 -0.25 0.30 -0.37 0.67 0.45 0.05 0.63 0.00 1.00
19 Number of IPOs in 3 preceding months (market) 146.02 57.55 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.25 -0.03 0.15 -0.20 0.23 -0.35 -0.23 -0.02 -0.21 -0.02 -0.35 1.00
20 Number of IPOs in 3 preceding months (software) 19.93 12.32 -0.20 0.22 0.04 -0.23 0.05 -0.13 -0.06 -0.21 -0.01 0.04 -0.09 0.08 -0.25 -0.29 -0.12 -0.14 0.00 -0.05 0.63 1.00
21 Underwriter prestige 7.24 2.04 0.12 0.17 0.05 0.17 -0.05 0.05 -0.13 0.21 -0.04 -0.20 0.23 -0.31 0.59 0.44 0.07 0.61 0.01 0.73 -0.20 -0.03 1.00
22 VC-back dummy 0.65 0.48 -0.03 0.05 0.01 0.08 -0.04 -0.12 -0.10 0.00 -0.02 -0.38 0.15 -0.36 0.23 0.10 -0.08 0.22 -0.01 0.29 -0.05 -0.02 0.44 1.00
23 1990-1998 period 0.60 0.49 0.24 -0.16 -0.01 0.25 0.03 0.14 0.06 -0.18 -0.12 0.23 -0.29 0.33 -0.31 -0.07 0.09 -0.22 -0.02 -0.52 0.52 -0.01 -0.31 -0.18 1.00





Table 2: Probit and Tobit Models Predicting CEO Equity Share Sales at IPO 
  1 2 3   4 5 6 
VARIABLES Likelihood of share sale   Percent of share sale 





























CEO share value proportion × CEO founder status 
 
-0.15 





   
(0.083) 
CEO share value proportion × Director stock sale 0.33 
   
0.03 
   
(0.242) 
   
(0.073) 
Chairman 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 
0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
CEO firm tenure 0.01* 0.01 0.01 
 
0.00+ 0.00 0.00 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEO age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO annual cash compensation 0.07+ 0.15** 0.13* 
 
0.02 0.03+ 0.02 
 (0.045) (0.059) (0.060) 
 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) 
Prior entrepreneurial experience 0.06 0.04 0.05 
 
0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.051) (0.049) (0.050) 
 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
CEO pre-IPO stock ownership 0.30** 0.13 0.15 
 
0.07* 0.03 0.04 
 (0.102) (0.114) (0.118) 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Board size -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
 
-0.00 -0.01+ -0.01+ 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Inside director proportion 0.09 -0.05 -0.06 
 
0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.107) (0.099) (0.099) 
 
(0.038) (0.033) (0.032) 
Pre-IPO total assets (log) -0.07* -0.04 -0.04 
 
-0.03** -0.02* -0.02* 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Pre-IPO  sales (log) 0.07* 0.03 0.03 
 
0.03* 0.01 0.01 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Firm age 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Post-IPO  sales (log) -0.03 -0.00 0.00 
 
-0.01 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.027) (0.025) (0.025) 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Offer price/book value -0.06+ -0.04 -0.04 
 
-0.01** -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.030) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
IPO proceeds (log) 0.15*** 0.06 0.07 
 
0.05*** 0.02 0.02+ 
 (0.038) (0.040) (0.041) 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
# of IPOs in 3 preceding months (market) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
-0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# of IPOs in 3 preceding months (software) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 
-0.00** -0.00* -0.00** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Underwriter prestige 0.02+ 0.01 0.01 
 
0.01* 0.01 0.01 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
VC-backed 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
 
-0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) 
 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
1990-1998 period 0.27*** 0.17* 0.17* 
 
0.11*** 0.05* 0.06* 
 (0.056) (0.066) (0.067) 
 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) 
1999-2000 period -0.00 0.02 0.03 
 
-0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
 
(0.074) (0.081) (0.082) 
 
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
Constant 
    
-0.20** -0.11 -0.11 
     
(0.075) (0.070) (0.069) 
        Observations 651 651 651 
 
651 651 651 
df_m 20 23 25 
 
20 23 25 
chi2 110.4 207.8 225.4 
    ll -279.7 -226.9 -225.6 
 
-28.40 23.24 24.76 
r2_p 0.246 0.388 0.391   0.750 1.205 1.218 





Table 3: Instrumental variable analysis 
  VC-backed   Non-VC-backed 
 
1 2 3 
 
4 5 6 
VARIABLES Director sale CEO sale CEO sale 
 
Director sale CEO sale CEO sale 
  IV 1 stage IV 2 stage Probit   IV 1 stage IV 2 stage Probit 
# of VC funds aged 8-15 years 0.50*** 
      
 
(0.101) 
      # of VC funds 8-15 that sold stocks in prior 3 months  0.28*** 
      
 
(0.086) 
      # of Non-CEO or Non-VC director sale in prior 3 months 
    
0.18** 
  
     
(0.056) 
  CEO share value proportion 0.94 0.52* 0.31 
 
-0.32 0.29+ 0.74* 
 
(0.989) (0.215) (0.249) 
 
(0.855) (0.166) (0.299) 
CEO founder status 0.02 0.04 0.04 
 
0.38 0.13* 0.25*** 
 
(0.213) (0.046) (0.046) 
 
(0.269) (0.054) (0.076) 









Chairman 0.10 -0.04 -0.03 
 
-0.12 0.03 0.04 
 
(0.185) (0.039) (0.043) 
 
(0.240) (0.049) (0.049) 
CEO firm tenure 0.04 0.02* 0.02** 
 
-0.05+ 0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.030) (0.007) (0.006) 
 
(0.031) (0.007) (0.007) 
CEO age -0.00 -0.00+ -0.00 
 
0.01 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.013) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.015) (0.003) (0.003) 
CEO annual cash compensation 0.07 0.14* 0.10 
 
0.31 0.12 0.21+ 
 
(0.285) (0.058) (0.067) 
 
(0.350) (0.080) (0.107) 
Prior entrepreneurial experience 0.17 -0.01 -0.01 
 
-0.27 0.09 0.14 
 
(0.239) (0.049) (0.050) 
 
(0.354) (0.062) (0.112) 
CEO pre-IPO equity ownership pct 0.62 0.35* 0.25 
 
-0.26 0.12 0.07 
 
(0.709) (0.163) (0.188) 
 
(0.559) (0.114) (0.129) 
Board size -0.03 -0.01 -0.03+ 
 
-0.04 0.01 -0.00 
 
(0.068) (0.013) (0.017) 
 
(0.070) (0.014) (0.017) 
Inside director proportion -0.47 0.05 -0.15 
 
0.47 0.11 0.07 
 
(0.645) (0.134) (0.125) 
 
(0.610) (0.124) (0.126) 
Pre-IPO total assets (log) -0.30 -0.05+ -0.08+ 
 
-0.28+ -0.03 -0.04 
 
(0.185) (0.030) (0.042) 
 
(0.151) (0.031) (0.035) 
Pre-IPO total sales (log) 0.36* 0.04 0.06 
 
0.25 0.02 0.07 
 
(0.181) (0.029) (0.040) 
 
(0.202) (0.041) (0.046) 
Firm age 0.03 -0.00 -0.00 
 
0.04+ 0.00 0.01 
 
(0.022) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.021) (0.005) (0.005) 
Post-IPO total sales (log) -0.25 -0.03 -0.03 
 
-0.06 0.01 -0.03 
 
(0.177) (0.028) (0.034) 
 
(0.157) (0.029) (0.038) 
Offer price/book value -0.39 -0.02 -0.02 
 
-0.49 -0.00 -0.11 
 
(0.681) (0.049) (0.023) 
 
(0.592) (0.116) (0.119) 
IPO proceeds (log) 0.60** 0.07 0.09+ 
 
0.70** 0.06 0.05 
 
(0.231) (0.044) (0.049) 
 
(0.261) (0.051) (0.068) 
# of IPOs in 3 prior months (market) -0.00* 0.00 0.00 
 
-0.01 0.00+ 0.00* 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
# of IPOs in 3 prior months (software) -0.04** -0.01*** -0.01** 
 
-0.03 -0.01+ -0.01* 
 
(0.013) (0.002) (0.003) 
 
(0.021) (0.003) (0.004) 
Underwriter prestige -0.12 0.01 0.02 
 
0.08 -0.01 0.00 
 
(0.081) (0.018) (0.022) 
 
(0.083) (0.016) (0.019) 
1990-1998 period 1.58*** 0.26** 0.21** 
 
0.67 0.02 0.02 
 
(0.376) (0.080) (0.079) 
 
(0.507) (0.102) (0.165) 
1999-2000 period -0.07 0.12 0.05 
 
0.49 -0.01 -0.11 
 
(0.519) (0.076) (0.092) 
 
(0.567) (0.109) (0.091) 









        Observations 427 427 427 
 
224 224 224 
df_m 22 22 22 
 
22 22 22 
chi2 212.1 212.1 138.6 
 
150.4 150.4 94.35 
ll -312.2 -312.2 -146.7 
 
-157.3 -157.3 -60.57 
r2_p . . 0.387   . . 0.538 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Figure 2: Interaction of CEO equity value proportion and founder status  
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CHAPTER 3: ESSAY 2 
 





In my first essay, I find that insiders often sell secondary shares at the IPO to 
diversify their portfolios. In this essay, I examine how insiders’ secondary share sales at 
the IPO affect underpricing. Although insiders’ secondary share sales at the IPO are 
usually interpreted as a negative signal, I find that IPO firms can actually gain benefit 
when insiders sell secondary shares at the IPO. Specifically, I find that outside directors 
can bargain for a higher offer price when they sell secondary shares and as a result such 
sales lead to a lower underpricing. That is, IPO firms can leave less money on the table 
when outside directors sell secondary shares. I find that the results are primarily driven 
by sales by outside directors (VC and other institutional investors) as opposed to 
managers. This suggests that the bargaining mechanism plays an important role in 
predicting both pre-IPO offer price revision and IPO underpricing, or alternatively, that 






Prior studies have mixed findings on how insiders’ secondary share sales at the 
IPO impact IPO underpricing, or the difference between the closing stock price at the end 
of first day of trading and the offer price. Some studies do not find any significant effects. 
Some other studies find a negative association. In explaining the negative association, 
there are two possible mechanisms. Some studies suggest that insiders’ secondary share 
sales at the IPO are a negative signal and investors will pay less for the issues with 
secondary shares to compensate for risks. However, this paper suggests that insiders 
bargain for a higher offer price when they intend to sell secondary shares at the IPO and 
thereby result in a lower underpricing. This paper also disaggregates insider groups into 
outside and inside directors – a distinction generally missing in the literature, Ljungqvist 
& Wilhelm (2003) notwithstanding. This paper finds that secondary share sales by 
outside directors are significantly associated with upward pre-IPO offer price revision 
and lower underpricing, while sales by insiders are not. 
 IPOs provide a short window of opportunity for existing shareholders to liquidate 
some of their holdings. Prior to IPO, it is difficult for shareholders to sell their shares as 
there is no liquid market. These shareholders generally agree to a six-month lock-up 
period post-IPO in which they agree not to sell their shares. However, they have an 
opportunity to sell shares at the IPO in what is called secondary share selling. 
Because of the severe information asymmetry between IPO firms and investors, 
secondary share sales at the IPO by insiders are usually interpreted as a negative signal 
by investors. The reasons are as follows: first, compared with outside investors, insiders 




the information asymmetry. For example, insiders may know some negative information 
about the firm which is not available to investors and hence sell shares at the IPO to 
reduce their interest stakes in the firm (Leland & Pyle, 1977). Second, a reduction in 
insider ownership may reduce the alignment of incentives between managers and 
shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, investors may interpret secondary 
share sales at the IPO as either a signal of poor quality or an increased likelihood of post-
IPO moral hazard. In either case, secondary share sales by insiders are interpreted as a 
negative signal.  
 In addition to the factors that impact the first day close stock price as mentioned 
above, factors that affect offer price also need to be considered when studying 
underpricing. There are several reasons why underwriters want to underprice the IPO 
shares. First, underwriters may underprice the IPO shares as a mechanism to transfer 
benefits to their loyal institutional investors (Loughran & Ritter, 2002). Institutional 
investors can then buy IPO shares from underwriters at a lower price and sell the shares 
at a higher price on the first trading day. By doing so, underwriters strengthen their 
relationships with their loyal institutional investors. Second, if underwriters underprice 
the IPO shares, they reduce risk in that they may not need to use other measures to 
stabilize share prices after the issues (Baron, 1982). Therefore, underwriters may seek to 
underprice the IPO shares independent of insiders’ motivations. In contrast, underpricing 
is not in the interest of pre-IPO shareholders since underpricing leaves money on the 
table and reduces IPO proceeds. Therefore, underwriters and the IPO firm’s interests 
conflict with each other regarding underpricing and the IPO offer price is the result of the 




Many factors may affect how hard insiders will bargain with underwriters on offer 
price and one important factor is whether insiders plan to sell secondary shares at the IPO. 
All else being equal, insiders have stronger incentives to bargain for a higher offer price 
when they intend to sell secondary shares at the IPO so that they can gain more benefits. 
And the strength of insiders’ bargaining power may increase with the number of shares 
they intend to sell. Through the analysis of 620 U.S. IPOs from computer software 
industry, this paper provides evidence for bargaining mechanism. In addition, this paper 
finds that different insiders influence underpricing differentially. More specifically, 
secondary share sales by outside directors are significantly associated with upward pre-
IPO offer price revision and lower IPO underpricing.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
  
Insiders’ secondary share sales at the IPO are usually interpreted as a negative 
signal. An IPO is characterized by information asymmetry between potential investors 
and insiders (Carter & Manaster, 1990; Leland & Pyle, 1977; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 
1999). Insiders have access to extensive information regarding the internal operation of 
the firm, its economic potential, and the industriousness of its management and 
employees (Cohen & Dean, 2005; Leland & Pyle, 1977). In contrast, public investors 
have relatively limited knowledge of the firm and a variety of factors leave substantial 
scope for the provision of less than perfect information to potential investors (Downes & 
Heinkel, 1982). First, organizations are a complex combination of strategy, technology, 




impossible to convey to public investors. Second, information received by public 
investors is screened by insiders, who tend to misrepresent the firm favorably to 
themselves (Downes & Heinkel, 1982). Third, although the SEC requires IPO firms to 
disclose information to public investors, in no way can it be guaranteed that all the 
material information is disclosed.  
 As a result potential investors tend to ignore certain information released by the 
IPO firm because it is tainted by incentives for misrepresentation or omission (Riley, 
1979; Spence, 1976) and these investors will be particularly responsive to valid signals of 
value (Downes & Heinkel, 1982; Spence, 1976). As suggested by Podolny (1994), when 
the quality or value of commodities potentially exchanged is difficult to discern, actors 
cannot compare exchange opportunities by focusing on the commodities themselves. 
Consequently, investors will rely on signals of economic value that they perceive as more 
genuine, and disregard those factors deemed suspicious or manipulable. To qualify as a 
credible signal, an action must be costly to mimic for low quality players (Spence, 1976). 
For insiders of high quality firms, holding shares of the firm is less risky since the firm’s 
prospects are good. In contrast, the costs and risks of holding the shares of a poor quality 
firm are higher. Hence, insiders’ secondary share sales at the IPO signal to outsiders that 
holding the firm’s shares is risky and costly. This line of argument is consistent with prior 
studies and is widely adopted to explain how public investors perceive insiders’ 
secondary share sales at IPO (e.g., Jain & Kini, 1994; Junkunc & Eckhardt, 2009).  
In addition to the private information view, agency theory also suggests that 
secondary share sales by insiders are negatively perceived by investors (Jensen & 




and this alignment strengthens as ownership increases. Secondary share sales by insiders 
reduce ownership and may, therefore, lead to a divergence of interests. That implies that 
even if insiders’ secondary share sales at the IPO are not driven by negative private 
information, less motivated managers may lead to less valuable firms. Therefore, insiders’ 
secondary share sales at the IPO may lead to investors’ lower willingness to pay for the 
concern of negative signal and possibly lower underpricing.  
However, there are other reasons to expect a higher underpricing. Underwriters 
have incentives to underprice IPO shares. Underwriters, as intermediaries, advise the 
issuers on pricing the issue, both at the time of issuing a preliminary prospectus that 
includes a file price range, and at the pricing meeting when the final offer price is set. If 
underwriters receive compensation from both the issuer (the gross spread) and investors, 
they have an incentive to recommend a lower offer price than if the compensation was 
merely the gross spread. In the process of book building, underwriters can decide to 
whom to allocate shares if there is excess demand. In practice, underwriters allocate 
shares to investors largely on the basis of past and future commission business on other 
trades. If the compensation underwriters receive from investors is significantly higher 
than the one they receive from the issuing firms, they are greatly incentivized to 
underprice the shares. For example, Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) received 
commission business equal to as much as 65% of the profits that some investors received 
from certain hot IPOs, such as the December 1999 IPO of VA Linux. The VA Linus IPO 
was priced at $30 per share, with a 7% gross spread equal to $2.10 per share. For an 
investor who was allocated shares at $30, and who then sold at the closing market price 




then traded shares to generate commissions of one-half of this profit, the total underwriter 
compensation per share was $2.10 plus $104.625, or $106.725. Therefore, underwriters 
have an incentive to underprice IPOs if they receive commissions in return for leaving 
money on the table. This mechanism is also documented in prior studies (e.g., Loughran 
& Ritter, 2004).  
 Underwriters have additional incentives to underprice the IPO shares. In a firm 
commitment deal, underwriters pledge to sell through the shares in the offering or else 
purchase them.
5
 With greater underpricing, underwriters reduce the likelihood of under-
subscription, which would force them to purchase the shares of the offering. In addition, 
with greater underpricing, underwriters face less pressure to conduct price stabilization 
post-IPO (Logue et al., 2002). When the stock price declines below the offer price, 
underwriters usually need to take measures to stabilize the stock price, which could be 
costly and capital-intensive. With greater underpricing, the probability of underwriters 
need to stabilize post-IPO stock price is lower.  
 After a company has decided to go public and has engaged an underwriter, it files 
a preliminary prospectus with the SEC that contains, among other things, the terms of the 
offering. The anticipated offer price is stated in the form of an offer range, in which 
minimum and maximum prices are given; the expected offer price is the midpoint of this 
range. The setting of the offer range is prescribed by the SEC’s Regulation S-K only in 
that it must be a ‘bona fide estimate’ of the final offer price. The time from the filing of 
the preliminary prospectus to the final offer date is called the ‘waiting period’, during 
which the underwriter acquires information about the demand for the issue from regular 
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 This is in contrast to a “best effort” deal where no such guarantee of selling the entire offering is made. 




investors through nonbinding indications of interest. Regular investors are those that are 
actively involved on an ongoing basis in purchasing shares of firms going public. If 
demand for the issue is greater than expected, the final offer price will be set higher than 
the expected offer price disclosed in the preliminary prospectus. Alternatively, if demand 
is low, the final offer price will be below the expected offer price.  
Although the information underwriters acquire during the waiting period affects 
the IPO offer price revision, some other important factors also affect this process. One 
important factor is the insiders’ secondary share sales. Per principal-agent theory, insiders 
who wish to sell secondary shares will work harder to ensure a higher offer price. These 
insiders, the agents, will increase their monitoring when their stake in the transaction is 
large. Therefore, we would expect underpricing to decrease with the amount of secondary 
share selling. That is, when insiders intend to sell secondary shares at the IPO, they have 
more interests involved and hence have more incentives to monitor underwriters and 
bargain for a higher offer price during the waiting period (Habid & Ljungqvist, 2001).  
If secondary selling incentivizes insiders to bargain for a higher offer price, we 
should see offer that price revision in waiting period is significantly associated with 
insiders’ secondary share sales. Therefore, I have the following prediction: 
H1: Insiders’ secondary share sales at the IPO are positively associated with the pre-
IPO offer price revision in the waiting period. 
 From the above, we know the negative signal argument suggests that investors 
will pay a lower first day closing price to compensate for the risks when the issue 
includes insiders’ secondary share sales. It follows that all else being equal the first day 




Meanwhile, insiders will bargain for a higher offer price when they intend to sell 
secondary shares at the IPO. As underpricing is the difference between the first day 
closing price and the offer price, this suggests lower underpricing. Therefore, I have the 
following prediction: 






 My sample includes 633 U.S. IPOs issued from 1990 to 2011 in three sectors of 
the computer software industry: computer programming services (SIC 7371), computer 
software (SIC 7372), and computer integrated systems design (SIC 7373). I constructed 
the sample IPO firms from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Global New Issues 
database. Following prior research (Chen, Hambrick & Pollock, 2008; Pollock & 
Rindova, 2003; Ritter, 1991), I exclude any spin-off or equity carve-out IPOs to ensure 
that the sample firms were only independent entrepreneurial firms. I also exclude foreign 
firms issuing stocks in the US market. Firm characteristics, issue characteristics, 
secondary sales by insiders, and pre-IPO financial data were drawn from IPO firms’ 
prospectuses (424B form) and SDC dataset. These prospectuses are available from SEC 






 IPO underpricing is this paper’s dependent variable and is calculated as (closing 
price-offer price)/offer price. To test the bargaining mechanism, this paper adopts price 
revision as a dependent variable. 
Independent Variables 
 Fraction of shares sold by all insiders relative to pre-IPO outstanding shares. 
This variable is calculated as the ratio of the number of secondary shares sold by all 
insiders divided by the total number of pre-IPO outstanding shares. This variable 
measures the proportion of pre-IPO outstanding shares sold by all insiders. 
 Fraction of shares sold by CEO relative to firm pre-IPO outstanding shares. 
This variable is calculated as the ratio of the number of shares sold by a CEO divided by 
the total number of pre-IPO outstanding shares of the firm. This variable measures the 
proportion of shares sold by a CEO to the total number of firm pre-IPO outstanding 
shares. 
Fraction of shares sold by non-CEO executives relative to firm pre-IPO 
outstanding shares. This variable is calculated as the ratio of the number of shares sold 
by non-CEO executives divided by the total number of pre-IPO outstanding shares of the 
firm. This variable measures the proportion of shares sold by non-CEO executives to the 
total number of firm pre-IPO outstanding shares. 
Fraction of shares sold by director executives relative to firm pre-IPO 
outstanding shares. This variable is calculated as the ratio of the number of shares sold 
by director executives divided by the total number of pre-IPO outstanding shares of the 
firm. This variable measures the proportion of shares sold by director executives to the 




Fraction of shares sold by non-director executives relative to firm pre-IPO 
outstanding shares. This variable is calculated as the ratio of the number of shares sold 
by non-director executives divided by the total number of pre-IPO outstanding shares of 
the firm. This variable measures the proportion of shares sold by non-director executives 
to the total number of firm pre-IPO outstanding shares. 
Fraction of shares sold by outside directors relative to firm pre-IPO outstanding 
shares. This variable is calculated as the ratio of the number of shares sold by outside 
directors divided by the total number of pre-IPO outstanding shares of the firm. This 
variable measures the proportion of shares sold by outside directors to the total number of 
firm pre-IPO outstanding shares. 
Control Variables 
 Firm characteristics. To control for other alternative explanations, I include the 
following variables in my regression: (1) Logged value of Pre-IPO total assets; (2) 
Logged value of Pre-IPO total sales; (3) Firm age; (4) Board size. It refers to the number 
of directors. 
IPO characteristics. I include the following IPO characteristics in my regression: 
(1) Logged value of IPO proceeds. This variable measures the size of the IPO. (2) 
Syndicate size. Syndicate size refers to the number of underwriters. (3) Overhang. This 
variable is calculated as the ratio of the shares retained by all insiders divided by shares 
filed (including primary and secondary shares) (Bradley & Jordan, 2002). (4) Average 
underpricing in the 30 days preceding the focal IPO in the same industry. In price 
revision regression, I control for the issuers’ contemporaries in the primary market. For 




positive price revisions, an issuing firm may infer that investors revealed positive 
information about the valuation factor and increase its offer price in response. More 
specifically, I define an issuer’s contemporaries as firms in the same industry completing 
an IPO in 30 days preceding the focal IPO and control for their average underpricing. 
This approach has been used in prior studies (e.g., Benveniste, Busaba, & Wilhelm, 2002; 
Benveniste & Spindt, 1989). 
Underwriter prestige.  Underwriters are important players during the IPO process 
(Carter & Manaster, 1990). Underwriter prestige data can be constructed in the spirit of 
the methodology of Cater and Manaster (1990). The online data are constructed by Jay 
Ritter and extensively used in finance literature (e.g. Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, 2003; 
Loughran & Ritter, 2004). 
VC. The variable of VC is a dummy variable that indicates if the IPO firm is 
backed by any venture capital firm. The variable is coded as 1 if the IPO firm is backed 
by a venture capital firm; 0 otherwise.  The data were drawn from the SDC database and I 
also collected the relevant information from IPO firms’ prospectuses to validate the SDC 
data.  
InvPrice. Following prior studies (e.g., Tinic, 1988), this paper uses this variable 
to proxy for issuer risk and it is equal to the reciprocal of the filing midpoint.   
Price revision. When predicting IPO underpricing, I include price revision as one 
control variable. Price revision is measured as the percentage difference between the 
offer price and the midpoint of the filing price: (offer price – midpoint of the initial filing 




Year dummies. Following prior studies (Loughran & Ritter, 2004; Ljungqvist & 
Wilhelm, 2003), this paper creates dummies for years preceding internet bubble period, 




Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and correlations. From Table 1, we can see 
that the average IPO underpricing of the sample firms is 0.42. The average percent sold 
by insiders is around 2%. An average IPO has more than 14 underwriters. An average 
firm is less than 10 years old. About 70% of sample firms are VC-backed. 25% of the 
sample firms did their IPOs during the bubble period (1999-2000) and 15% did their 
IPOs after the bubble period (2001-2011) and 60% of firms did their IPOs during the pre-
bubble period (1990-1998).  
 Table 2 reports the results that examine how secondary sales by insiders impact 
price revision.  Standard errors are adjusted for the bias caused by time clustering of 
observations
6
. Model 1 in Table 2 is a baseline model, including all control variables.  In 
Model 2, the coefficient of the fraction sold by outside directors is positive and 
marginally significant (β=29.93; p< .1), suggesting that the higher the percentage of 
shares outside directors sell, the higher the offer price revision is. In Models 2, I did not 
consider the endogeneity of underwriter prestige. Self-selection bias may cause the 
coefficients estimated for the effect of underwriter prestige on the extent of price 
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 According to Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), when many companies go public at the same point in time, 
it is questionable whether their residuals are cross-sectionally independent. Thus, we replace the i.i.d. 
assumption with the weaker assumption that observations are independent for companies at different points 
in time, but not necessarily for companies going public in the same month, and adjust the variance 




revisions in Model 2 to be biased. If firms with the most (or the least) potential to receive 
upward price revision choose the top underwriters, the positive correlation between 
underwriter prestige and price revisions may not be causal but a by-product of the 
selection behavior of such firms. I therefore estimate a 2SLS version of Model 2 that 
explicitly treats underwriter choice as endogenous (Habib & Ljungqvist, 2001; 
Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, 2003). The first stage, Model 3, relates underwriter prestige to all 
independent regressors in Model 2 and two additional variables added to ensure 
identification: A dummy equaling one if the issue is VC-backed and the log of the 
intended offer size, in millions of dollars (Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, 2003). The rationale 
for the instruments is as follows. Venture capitalists are repeat players in the IPO market 
and can develop long-term relationships with top-tier underwriters, and thereby increase 
the chances that such underwriters will underwrite a given IPO. This idea is consistent 
with Megginson and Weiss’s (1991) finding that VC-backed IPOs are underwritten by 
more prestigious underwriters. With regard to offer size, a given degree of percentage 
underpricing translates into a larger wealth loss to the owners, the larger the deal. This in 
turn creates an incentive to choose a top-tier underwriter in an attempt to reduce the 
degree of underpricing. From Model 3, we can see that more prestigious underwriters are 
chosen by VC-backed and bigger firms, those filing larger offers.  
Using the predicted underwriter prestige from Model 3 as an instrument, Models 
5 provides consistent estimates of the effect of outside directors’ secondary share sales on 
price revisions. In Model 5, the coefficient of the fraction sold by outside directors is 
positive and marginally significant (β=31.83; p< .1), consistent with the finding in Model 




either more upward price revision or less downward price revision. These findings are 
consistent with the bargaining mechanism. 
Table 3 reports the results that examine the impact of secondary share sales by 
insiders on underpricing. Similar to Table 2, Table 3 also includes results that consider 
the endogeneity of underwriter choice in Models 2 and 4, which are the second stage 
regressions. In Models 1, the coefficient of the fraction sold by executives is negative and 
marginally significant (β=-1.12; p< .1), suggesting that the more secondary shares sold by 
executives, the lower the underpricing. Similarly, the coefficient of the fraction sold by 
outside directors is negative and marginally significant (β=-.53; p< .1), suggesting that 
the more secondary shares sold by outside directors, the lower the underpricing. I used 
the predicted underwriter prestige in Model 2 and get the same results. Furthermore, I 
split insiders into CEO, inside directors, and outside directors and report results in Model 
3 and 4. In Model 3, the coefficient of the fraction sold by inside directors is negative and 
marginally significant (β=-.93; p< .1) and similarly for outside directors (β=-.54; p< .1), 
suggesting that the more secondary shares sold by directors, the lower the underpricing.  
As a further robustness check, I use the dollar value of secondary shares sold by insiders 




This paper finds that insiders’ secondary share sales at the IPO are significantly 
associated with IPO underpricing and suggests that bargaining mechanism impacts IPO 




outside directors are significantly associated with offer price revision. In addition, this 
paper finds that secondary share sales by outside directors are significantly associated 
with lower underpricing.  
 Stock ownership is adopted to align the interests of managers and shareholders. 
Selling part the stock holding of the firm can usually be used by outside investors to 
make inferences about the firm. The signaling effect of the share sales by insiders 
becomes stronger when there is severe information asymmetry. Suggested by agency 
theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and signaling theory (Leland & Pyle, 1977), secondary 
share sales at IPO by insiders are interpreted as a negative signal and mean higher risks 
for investors. To compensate for the high risks, investors pay less for the issues with 
secondary shares, which suggests a lower underpricing.  
 When insiders intend to sell secondary shares at the IPO, they have more 
incentives to bargain for a higher offer price since they can get more benefits from the 
sales. Interestingly, I find that only secondary share sales by outside directors are 
associated with price revision. It does not mean CEOs and non-CEO executives lack the 
incentives to bargain for a high offer price. It may be that only outside directors have the 
capability to bargain successfully for a higher offer price when they intend to sell shares. 
As we know, outside directors are usually venture capital firms and other institutional 
investors. Compared with outside directors, CEOs and non-CEO executives have less 
experience of working with underwriters and stock market. As professional investors, 
outside directors may repeatedly work with underwriters and hence have more bargaining 
power. To favor the possible future cooperation with these professional investors, 




when these outside directors request a higher offer price. Prior studies have documented 
that venture capital firms and investment banks oftentimes work on a mutually beneficial 
basis so that they can keep working with each other on multiple deals. For example, 
venture capital firms can choose an investment bank with whom they have a good 
working relationship to underwrite other IPO firms they invest. In contrast, the 
cooperation between underwriter and CEO or non-CEO executives is more likely to be a 
one-time deal, which weakens the bargaining power of CEO and other executives.  
 This paper has limitations. When I test the bargaining mechanism, I argue that 
when insiders intend to sell secondary shares at IPO, they will bargain hard with 
underwriters for a higher offer price. Empirically, I test if the insiders’ secondary share 
sales are significantly associated with pre-IPO offer price revision during the waiting 
period. However, I cannot observe the timing of the bargaining. Offer price revision may 
occur prior to bargaining or in its absence altogether. That is, the offer price revision may 
not be the result of the bargaining and it may be the reason why insiders decided to sell 
secondary shares, which is an example of reverse causality. To test empirically the 
direction of the causality, I can do the following. In the preliminary prospectus IPO firms 
filed with SEC, there is information about the estimated offer price range and insiders’ 
planned secondary sales. Also, in the final prospectus, there is information about the final 
offer price and insiders’ actual secondary share sales. One test I can do is to examine if 
insiders increased the number of secondary shares from the planned sales in the 
preliminary prospectus to the actual sales in the final prospectus and determine if this 
increase is accompanied with an upward offer price revision. If the increase is 




made changes to their secondary share sales in response to the offer price revision, that is, 
offer price revision may cause the changes of insiders’ secondary share sales. If the 
number of secondary sales remains the same in both prospectuses but the offer price 
experienced an upward revision or a less downward revision, it is more likely that 
insiders’ bargaining is working in the process. Of course, these two possibilities may 
exist simultaneously, in some cases, an upward offer price revision occurs because of 
insiders’ bargaining and in other cases, insiders decided to sell secondary shares after 
they see an upward offer price revision. Although this is not a perfect test that can help 
infer the causality, it helps my hypothesis of bargaining mechanism closer to a causal 
relationship. A second limitation of this study is that I argue that investors will pay less 
for the issues with insiders’ secondary share sales at the IPO in response to the associated 
negative signal. However, I cannot directly test this prediction. The second limitation of 
this paper is that I use the percentage change of pre-IPO offer price revision as my 
dependent variable when I test the bargaining mechanism. Although the percent change 
can already give us some good insights on how significant insiders’ secondary share sales 
at IPO impact pre-IPO offer price revision, I can also see the dollar value changes as 
dependent variable. For insiders, it is more intuitive to see how many more dollars they 
can earn if they can successfully bargain $1 higher than the planned offer price. It is also 
good to have as a robustness check using dollar value change as a dependent variable.  
 To improve further the robustness of this paper, there is some work that this paper 
can do. First, this paper examines how insiders’ secondary share sales at the IPO impact 
IPO underpricing as my overall research question. An alternative empirical strategy to 




sample of IPOs without insiders’ secondary share sales at the IPO and  match it with ones 
with secondary share sales as closely as possible by some important characteristics such 
as offering size and year (Megginson & Weiss, 1991). By comparing the IPO 




Table 1:  Correlations 
 
 
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
1 Underpricing 0.42 0.70 1.00
2 Price revis ion (pct) 11.36 30.39 0.59 1.00
3 Pct sold by ins iders 2.04 4.14 -0.15 -0.05 1.00
4 Value of ins ider sa le (mi l l ion) 2.75 10.82 -0.15 -0.04 0.78 1.00
5 Pct sold by CEO 0.58 1.61 -0.08 -0.02 0.56 0.47 1.00
6 Value of CEO sa le (mi l l ion) 0.70 2.57 -0.08 -0.01 0.47 0.73 0.72 1.00
7 Pct sold by non-CEO executives 0.50 1.51 -0.09 -0.02 0.55 0.46 0.37 0.35 1.00
8 Value of non-CEO executive sa le (mi l l ion) 0.65 2.71 -0.10 -0.01 0.45 0.71 0.30 0.59 0.72 1.00
9 Pct sold by director executives 0.90 2.33 -0.10 -0.02 0.64 0.52 0.86 0.65 0.74 0.52 1.00
10 Value of di rector executive sa le (mi l l ion) 1.12 4.62 -0.10 0.00 0.52 0.78 0.64 0.92 0.54 0.77 0.73 1.00
11 Pct sold by non-director executives 0.17 0.71 -0.06 -0.02 0.33 0.34 0.25 0.25 0.55 0.50 0.22 0.21 1.00
12 Value of non-director executive sa le (mi l l ion) 0.23 1.11 -0.07 -0.03 0.30 0.50 0.20 0.39 0.44 0.67 0.18 0.36 0.80 1.00
13 Pct sold by outs ide directors 0.97 3.10 -0.11 -0.05 0.78 0.57 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.07 1.00
14 Value of outs ide director sa le (mi l l ion) 1.40 7.60 -0.12 -0.04 0.64 0.74 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.26 0.06 0.26 0.09 0.18 0.82 1.00
15 Underwriter prestige 7.24 2.05 0.25 0.25 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.14 0.03 0.15 0.02 0.16 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.09 1.00
16 Underpricing in last month 0.44 0.47 0.48 0.36 -0.22 -0.23 -0.11 -0.13 -0.11 -0.14 -0.12 -0.14 -0.11 -0.15 -0.18 -0.15 0.17 1.00
17 # of underwriters 14.83 10.50 -0.04 0.06 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.25 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.25 -0.07 1.00
18 Total  sa le pre-IPO log 2.74 1.29 -0.12 -0.06 0.19 0.33 0.10 0.25 0.08 0.23 0.10 0.26 0.07 0.19 0.16 0.23 0.44 -0.09 0.19 1.00
19 Total  asset pre-IPO log 2.57 1.34 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.19 -0.02 0.14 -0.02 0.13 -0.03 0.14 -0.01 0.12 0.09 0.17 0.59 0.04 0.13 0.77 1.00
20 Firm age 9.29 5.61 -0.17 -0.16 0.21 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.14 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.07 -0.10 0.14 0.47 0.27 1.00
21 Overhang 4.39 5.86 0.12 0.09 -0.05 0.15 -0.02 0.24 -0.02 0.19 -0.02 0.22 0.00 0.15 -0.05 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.19 -0.01 1.00
22 VC dummy 0.69 0.46 0.17 0.17 -0.11 -0.10 -0.12 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.12 -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 0.41 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.17 -0.14 0.07 1.00
23 IPO proceeds  log 3.44 0.85 0.32 0.37 0.05 0.22 -0.05 0.15 0.00 0.16 -0.04 0.16 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.20 0.74 0.26 0.11 0.45 0.67 0.05 0.17 0.25 1.00
24 InvPrice 0.10 0.04 -0.14 -0.11 -0.16 -0.26 -0.08 -0.19 -0.11 -0.20 -0.09 -0.20 -0.09 -0.17 -0.12 -0.17 -0.72 -0.10 -0.33 -0.44 -0.55 -0.12 -0.17 -0.29 -0.71 1.00
25 1999-2000 dummy 0.25 0.44 0.46 0.24 -0.25 -0.28 -0.18 -0.20 -0.15 -0.18 -0.18 -0.20 -0.14 -0.18 -0.17 -0.18 0.25 0.72 -0.06 -0.16 0.05 -0.19 0.05 0.18 0.31 -0.21 1.00





Table 2: OLS predicting price revision
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  1 2 3 4 5 
VARIABLES Offer price revision   Underwriter prestige  Offer price revision 
            



























Underwriter prestige 3.81*** 3.77*** 
   
 
(0.717) (0.724) 
   Underwriter prestige (predicted) 
   
12.89*** 13.00*** 
    
(1.081) (1.110) 
Underpricing in one month before 26.54*** 26.74*** -0.21 27.30*** 27.50*** 
 
(5.575) (5.604) (0.162) (4.992) (5.007) 
# of underwriters 0.01 -0.01 0.02* -0.33* -0.35** 
 
(0.114) (0.117) (0.006) (0.125) (0.127) 
Total sales 1 year before -3.98* -4.16* 0.16+ -5.21** -5.32** 
 
(1.907) (1.912) (0.082) (1.869) (1.876) 
Total asset 1 year before 2.99 3.14 0.15+ -3.17 -3.22 
 
(2.484) (2.497) (0.083) (2.299) (2.333) 
Firm age -7.60*** -7.93*** -0.03 -5.21** -5.19** 
 
(1.928) (1.962) (0.106) (1.820) (1.858) 
Overhang 0.14 0.16 0.02** -0.09 -0.08 
 
(0.132) (0.136) (0.007) (0.107) (0.109) 
1999-2000 dummy -13.68** -13.04* 0.21 -24.36*** -24.27*** 
 
(4.963) (5.030) (0.175) (4.733) (4.863) 
Post-2000 dummy -9.39* -9.25* -0.55** -12.74** -13.07** 
 





   
(0.115) 




   
(0.112) 
  Constant -4.64 -4.33 1.07** -47.78*** -48.34*** 
 
(3.925) (3.973) (0.363) (5.275) (5.420) 
      Observations 621 621 622 621 621 
R-squared 0.225 0.227 0.621 0.328 0.330 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; One-tail 
 
 
                                                          
7
 Price revision is calculated as the percentage: (offer price-original filed price)/original filed price * 100%; 
Overhang refers to the ration that shares retained by insiders divided by shares filed (including primary and 




Table 3: OLS predicting underpricing
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  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Underpricing 
          








  % sold by inside directors 
  
-0.93* -0.85* 
   
(0.449) (0.452) 
% sold by non-director executives 
  
1.14 1.23 
   
(1.450) (1.472) 
% sold by outside directors -0.53+ -0.54+ -0.54+ -0.55+ 
 
(0.337) (0.335) (0.343) (0.341) 

















# of directors -0.02* -0.02+ -0.02* -0.02+ 
 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Offer price revision 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Overhang 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
InvPrice 0.01 -0.59 0.04 -0.56 
 
(0.726) (0.827) (0.729) (0.829) 
Underpricing in one month before 0.19* 0.18* 0.19* 0.18* 
 
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) 
Total asset 1 year before -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
 
(0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) 
Firm age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
1999-2000 dummy 0.38*** 0.40*** 0.38*** 0.40*** 
 
(0.103) (0.098) (0.103) (0.098) 
Post-2000 dummy 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 
 
(0.058) (0.057) (0.058) (0.057) 
Constant 0.28 0.51* 0.27 0.51* 
 
(0.175) (0.215) (0.176) (0.215) 
     Observations 608 608 608 608 
R-squared 0.479 0.479 0.479 0.480 




                                                          
8
 InvPrice refers is a proxy for issuer risk, equal to the reciprocal of the original filed price. Tinic (1988) 




CHAPTER 4: ESSAY 3 
 
The Relationship Between Insiders’ Secondary Share Sales at IPO and Post-IPO 




This paper investigates whether insiders’ secondary share sales at the IPO impact 
a variety of performance measures post-IPO and the contingencies under which any 
impact may vary. Through the analysis of 500 IPOs of the U.S. computer software 
industry, I find that the percentage of secondary shares in an offering is associated with a 
slower post-IPO R&D growth. This effect is more negative for small firms. I adopt an 
instrumental variable approach to address the potential endogeneity issues and get the 
robust results. The causal relationship supports the hypothesis that equity ownership has 
















Equity ownership, as a corporate governance mechanism, has been of research 
interest for a long time. Although many studies have examined the relationship between 
corporate governance including equity ownership and firm performance, the evidence has 
been inconclusive overall (for reviews, see Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003; 
Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Dalton, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999). 
Specifically, two primary explanations have been offered to explain the link between 
equity ownership and firm performance. One stream draws on agency theory (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) and argues that equity ownership impacts incentives alignment and 
hence firm performance. This suggests a causal relationship between equity ownership 
and firm performance. A second stream draws on signaling theory (Leland & Pyle, 1977) 
to argue that insiders possess private information of the firm. Thus a reduction of insiders’ 
equity ownership in the firm is indicative of poor quality and is a negative signal of a 
firm’s future potential. Thus, insiders’ equity ownership reduction is a symptom of poor 
performance, though not a cause. Prior work struggles to tease these theories apart (e.g., 
Jain & Kini, 1994) but has not reached a conclusion yet. Given the high popularity of 
equity ownership used in aligning incentives in practice and the mixed explanations 
offered in the literature, it can assist in understanding managerial actions and designing 
appropriate corporate governance mechanisms if we can tease the above two explanations 
apart. In addition, although previous studies have directly examine the organizational 
consequences of equity ownership on strategic choices (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Baysinger, 
Kosnik, & Turk, 1991; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007) and 




Johnson, 1998; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998), little research has examined the 
contingencies under which the effectiveness of equity ownership may vary. To fill this 
gap, I explore the relationship between equity ownership and performance variations. 
Specifically, I examine the relationship between insiders’ secondary share sales at the 
IPO and firm performance and the contingency under which the relationship varies. In 
general, I find that insiders’ secondary share selling is associated with a slower post-IPO 
R&D growth and this effect is weaker for large firms. I test my theory with data gathered 
in 500 U.S. software IPOs from 1990 to 2011. 
 Equity ownership puts insiders’ personal wealth contingent on firm future 
performance, providing incentives to insiders. When firm performance and stock price go 
up, insiders incur an increase of personal wealth and vice versa. This mechanism is 
suggested by agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and is frequently drawn as the 
rationale why equity ownership can mitigate agency behavior, although lacking strong 
empirical evidence. Given the fact that equity ownership has become the dominant logic 
in compensation design in the past two decades (Beatty & Zajac, 1994), especially in 
small entrepreneurial firms (Kim & Nofsinger, 2007; Wasserman, 2006), it is important 
to investigate if equity ownership really matters for insider effort and firm performance. 
In addition, if equity ownership truly has significant impacts on insider effort and insider 
effort really matters for the firm performance as well, the effect of equity ownership may 
vary under different contingencies. That is, firm performance may differentially rely on 
insiders’ effort, or, the sensitivity of firm performance to insider effort may be different 




An IPO is a good context to investigate these questions. An IPO provides insiders 
an opportunity to sell equity shares (known as secondary shares) along with newly issued 
shares to the public on the IPO date. By selling equity shares at the IPO, insiders can 
change their equity ownership in the firm and these sales may affect incentive alignment. 
There are other advantages to studying IPO firms. First, they are generally comparable to 
each other. They are usually at an early stage in their development, need to raise financial 
capital, and in order to go public they must receive at least an acceptable evaluation from 
an underwriter. Second, whether insiders can sell secondary shares at the IPO is partly 
dependent on external market condition at time of the IPO and, as such, is partly 
exogenous. This allows me to adopt an instrumental variable approach to separate 
signaling and treatment effects. Lastly, secondary share sales are common, and this 
makes the study feasible.  
This exploratory study makes several contributions to the literature. First, the 
mechanism between equity ownership change and firm performance has served as the 
basis for many prior studies on CEO compensation, agency behavior, managerial 
incentives, and board governance and also as the rationale for its high popularity in 
practice. However, current research struggles to identify the mechanism and the results 
are thus far inconclusive (Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003). This study provides 
the evidence that insiders’ secondary share sales are related to changes in firm 
performance, especially post-IPO R&D growth.  
Second, this paper identifies one important contingency of equity ownership: firm 
size. Although I elaborate on the logic that the same compensation may have different 




contingency of equity ownership, firm size. This finding means that all firms do not 
benefit equally from equity ownership in aligning incentives. Instead, incentive alignment 
effects of equity ownership are nuanced, and the size or maturity of the firm must be 
taken into consideration. Prior studies ignored the differential impacts of equity 
ownership in different types of firms. This paper finds that post-IPO R&D growth of 
small firms is more negatively related to insiders’ secondary share sales at the IPO.  
This finding suggests that equity ownership is not uniformly beneficial to all firms. This 





Prior studies on corporate governance heavily draw on agency theory to 
investigate stakeholders’ behavior (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989; 
Westphal & Zajac, 1994). Agency-based studies highlight the risk differential between 
principals and agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). This stream of literature 
suggests that principals can diversify their wealth by spreading capital across different 
firms and thus are more risk neutral. In contrast, agents have already invested most of 
their human capital in one firm and receive compensation from the same firm and thus 
are more risk averse. This risk differential raises the possibility of interest conflicts 
between agents and principals. Therefore, agency-based studies suggest that self-
interested agents choose actions that maximize their personal utility (i.e., value), which 




 To mitigate the conflict of interest between agents and principals, agency-based 
studies prescribe two different ways. First, a firm’s board of directors, whose fiduciary 
duty is to monitor agents on behalf of shareholders, provide oversight on the agent. 
However, these monitoring mechanisms are usually difficult to implement, owing to their 
high cost and the unobservability of agent behaviors. Second, equity ownership can tie 
agents’ personal wealth closely to firm performance. This mechanism has been adopted 
by many firms to align the interests of agents and principals and becomes the dominant 
logic in compensation design (Eisenhardt, 1988; Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996; Tosi, 
Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Meijia, 2000; Welbourne, Balkin, & Gomez-Mejia, 1995). 
 Equity ownership often places substantial amounts of personal wealth at risk by 
tying them closely to firm performance (Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1999; Jensen & Murphy, 
1990). The rationale is that directly linking personal wealth to firm performance through 
equity can motivate agents to act congruently with the interests of shareholders. With 
equity shares in hand, an agent’s interest is more aligned with that of the firm and hence 
the agent is more likely to work hard for the firm. On the spectrum of equity ownership, 
when it goes from zero to one, an agent who has no ownership gradually turns into an 
owner who owns the complete ownership of the firm; simultaneously, agency wanes and 
stewardship grows (Wasserman, 2006). Therefore, the amount of equity shares held by an 
agent may largely be a proxy for his/her effort put into the firm.  
 A significant equity ownership change may take place at the time of the IPO. An 
IPO provides an opportunity for insiders to sell part of their equity holdings (known as 
secondary shares) of the firm along with the newly issued (primary) shares to the public 




incentive alignment. When insiders decrease their equity shares of the firm, their 
financial interest is less aligned with that of the firm and they may lower their willingness 
to work hard for the firm. Based on agency theory, we may expect the decrease of insider 
effort following their equity share sales at the IPO if incentive alignment mechanism 
really works and hence firm performance changes. This raises the question whether 
performance and investment change post-IPO and whether this change can be causally 
related to insiders’ equity share sales at the IPO. As a baseline hypothesis, I have the 
following prediction:  
H1: Secondary share sales at the IPO are negatively associated with firm post-IPO 
performance. 
Firm Size 
 The extent that equity ownership impacts firm outcomes is also dependent on the 
size of the firm. Specifically, large firms have more mature routines and institutionalized 
firm policies (Cyert & March, 1963) on many fronts such as R&D and investment. The 
more formal organizational structure or routines within the firm suggests that may firm 
decisions may be less dependent on any single person within the organization, including 
the CEO. In contrast, smaller firms are likely to have more immature bureaucracies 
which lead to greater influence of individuals. When insiders sell part of their equity 
shares at the IPO and decrease their efforts, the performance of small firms may change. 
Given the above argument, I have the following prediction:  
H2: Firm size weakens the negative relationship between insiders’ secondary share sales 








 My sample includes 500 U.S. IPOs issued from 1990 to 2011 in three sectors of 
the computer software industry: computer programming services (SIC 7371), computer 
software (SIC 7372), and computer integrated systems design (SIC 7373). I constructed 
the sample of IPO firms from the SDC Global New Issues database. Following prior 
research (Chen, Hambrick & Pollock, 2008; Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Ritter, 1991), I 
exclude any spin-off or equity carve-out IPOs to ensure that the sample firms are only 
independent entrepreneurial firms. I also excluded foreign firms issuing shares in the U.S. 
market. Firm characteristics, pre-IPO financial data, IPO-related data and upper echelons 
biographical data are drawn from the IPO firms’ prospectuses (424B form), SDC, and 
COMPUSTAT database. These prospectuses are available from the SEC Edgar online 
service and ThomsonONE database.  
Dependent Variable 
 I tested a variety of different dependent variables in this study and all of them are 
in one year post-IPO: Sales, sales growth rate, R&D expenditure, R&D expenditure 
growth rate, capital expenditure, asset turnover, operating return on assets, and operating 
cash flow deflated by total assets. The performance data are drawn from COMPUSTAT.  
Independent Variables 
Dummy if the IPO firms sell any secondary shares at the IPO. I adopted a 
dummy variable to indicate if an IPO firm sells any secondary shares at the IPO. It is 




 Percentage of secondary shares in the offering. This variable is calculated as the 
percentage of secondary shares relative to all the shares in the offering.   
Percentage of shares sold by the CEO relative to the firm pre-IPO outstanding 
shares. This variable is calculated as the ratio of the number of shares sold by the CEO 
divided by the total number of pre-IPO outstanding shares of the firm. 
Percentage of shares sold by the non-CEO executives relative to the firm pre-
IPO outstanding shares. This variable is calculated as the ratio of the number of shares 
sold by non-CEO executives divided by the total number of pre-IPO outstanding shares 
of the firm.  
Percentage of shares sold by outside directors relative to the firm pre-IPO 
outstanding shares. This variable is calculated as the ratio of the number of secondary 
shares sold by all outside directors divided by the total number of pre-IPO outstanding 
shares. Outside directors are generally VCs and other institutional investors.  
Firm size. I use pre-IPO firm’s total assets to measure firm size. Firm size data 
are drawn from the SDC. 
Control Variables  
Firm characteristics. Firm-related variables such as firm age, the log value of 
sales prior to the IPO, and the log value of R&D expenditure one year prior to the IPO 
are included in the regression to control for firm size effects and firm quality (Bloom & 
Milkovich, 1998).  
 IPO characteristics. To control for IPO-related factors, I include the following 
variables: (1) Log value of IPO proceeds. This variable measures the size of the IPO. (2) 




the higher the ratio, the more profitable the share sale is and the more likely the focal 
CEO sells some equity shares.  
  Underwriter prestige.  Underwriters are important players during the IPO process 
(Carter & Manaster, 1990). Underwriter prestige data can be constructed in the spirit of 
the methodology of Cater and Manaster (1990) and are available online at 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. The online data are constructed by Jay 
Ritter and extensively used in the finance literature (e.g. Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, 2003; 
Loughran & Ritter, 2004). 
VC. The variable of VC is a dummy variable that indicates if the IPO firm is 
backed by any venture capital firm. The variable is coded as 1 if the IPO firm is backed 
by a venture capital firm; 0 otherwise.  The data were drawn from the SDC database and I 
collected the relevant information from IPO firms’ prospectuses and VentureXpert 
database to validate the SDC data.  
Year period dummy. Because my sample includes IPOs covering 1990-2011, I 
create year period dummies to control for possible year effects. According to prior studies 
(e.g., Loughran & Ritter, 2004), the IPO market followed relative stable patterns in the 
periods 1990-1998, 1999-2000, and post-2000, respectively. In my analysis, I create three 
dummy variables to indicate these time periods.   
Method of Analysis 
 In this study, I attempt to test a causal relationship between secondary share sales 
at the IPO and post-IPO performance. Therefore, I must address endogeneity. 
Specifically, there may be a common factor that drives both secondary share sales at the 




pre-IPO, insiders are more likely to sell equity shares at the IPO to decrease their 
exposure to the poor quality firm; we are also more likely to observe a poor post-IPO 
performance. If this is the case, unobserved firm quality is the common cause for both 
insiders’ secondary share sales at the IPO and poor post-IPO performance. Then the 
relationship between insiders secondary share sales at the IPO and poor post-IPO 
performance is simply a correlation rather than a causal relationship. To address this 
endogeneity, I adopt an instrumental variable approach. The desirable instrumental 
variable should be correlated with insiders’ secondary share sales at the IPO but 
uncorrelated with post-IPO performance or unobserved firm quality. The instrumental 
variable I adopt in this study is the number of IPOs in the 2 months preceding the focal 
IPO. The number of IPOs in the 2 months preceding the focal IPO is an indicator of 
market hotness. The more IPOs, the hotter the IPO market is. A hot market leads insiders 
to expect a higher stock price in the future, which renders them less likely to sell shares at 
the IPO. As such, the number of IPOs in the 2 months preceding the focal IPO is 
supposed to be correlated with insiders’ share sales at the IPO. However, prior studies 
(e.g., Draho, 2004) suggest that the IPO market has high volatility and it may only take a 
few months for a hot market to change into a cold market. In addition, there is no 
evidence showing that IPO firms can exactly time their IPO. Therefore, market hotness 




Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and Table 2 reports correlations. From Table 




11.81% of the offerings consist of secondary shares. In each offering including secondary 
shares, the CEO sells 1% of the firm pre-IPO outstanding shares, non-CEO executives 
sell 1%, and outside directors sell 2.8%. Alternatively, CEOs sell 4.5% of their own pre-
IPO holdings, non-CEO executives sell 6.6%, and outside directors sell 9.2%. Sample 
firms are generally young and around 8 years. 65% of the sample firms are VC-backed 
firms. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 and 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
 To explore the relationship between secondary share sales and post-IPO 
performance, I tested different combinations of independent variables and dependent 
variables and summarize all the results in Table 3. The dependent variables I tested 
include: sales, sales growth rate, R&D expenditure, R&D growth rate, capital expenditure, 
asset turnover, operating return on asset, and operating cash flow deflated by total asset. 
From the results based on regular OLS in Table 3, one can see that I obtain the most 
consistent results when I use R&D growth rate in one year post-IPO as dependent 
variable. When the dummy whether IPO firms sell any secondary shares and the 
percentage of secondary shares in the offering serve as independent variables separately, 
they are only significant in predicting post-IPO R&D growth rate. When I use other firm 
performance variables, I obtain no significant results. This suggests that among the 
outcome measures, only post-IPO R&D growth rate may be significantly affected by 
secondary share sales at the IPO. Next, rather than look at all the insiders as a group, I 
split them into three subgroups: CEO, non-CEO executives, and outside directors to 





Insert Table 3 and 4 about here 
------------------------------ 
In Table 4, I report the results using post-IPO R&D growth rate as the dependent 
variable. Model 1 includes control variables and serves as a baseline model. In Model 2, 
the dummy if the IPO firm sells any secondary shares at the IPO is negative and 
significant (β=-.5, p<0.01), suggesting that compared with IPO firms that do not sell 
secondary shares at IPO, firms with secondary shares experience a slower post-IPO R&D 
growth rate. Similarly, in Model 3, the percentage of shares in the offering is negative 
and significant (β=-.02, p<0.01), suggesting that when the proportion of secondary shares 
in the offering is high, the firm experiences a slower post-IPO R&D growth rate. In a 
robustness check, I run Model 3 in the subgroup of firms that include secondary shares in 
the offering, the percentage of shares in the offering is negative and marginally 
significant (β=-.02, p<0.1) (not reported here). In Model 4, the percentage of shares sold 
by non-CEO executives relative to the firm pre-IPO outstanding shares is negative and 
significant (β=-13.58, p<0.05) and similarly the percentage of shares sold by outside 
directors is negative and significant (β=-5.86, p<0.01), suggesting that the secondary 
share sales by non-CEO executives and outside directors are significantly associated with 
a slower post-IPO R&D growth rate. Similarly, in another robustness check, I run Model 
4 in the subgroup of firms that include secondary shares in their offering, the percentage 
sold by non-CEO executives is negative and marginally significant (β=-10.98, p<0.1); the 
percentage sold by outside directors is negative and significant (β=-5.99, p<0.05). These 
results suggest that the findings in Table 4 are robust.  
As mentioned above, the results in Table 4 may suffer from endogeneity issues. 




rate may be simply a correlation instead of a causal relationship. To address this potential 
endogeneity, I adopted an instrumental variable approach. It is a difficult task to find 
appropriate instrumental variables. In this study, the instrumental variable I tentatively 
adopted is the number of IPOs in 2 months preceding the focal IPO. I report the 
instrumental analysis in Table 5. Model 1 is the first stage, using the number of IPOs in 
the 2 months preceding the focal IPO to predict the likelihood of an offering including 
secondary shares. As you can see, the number of IPOs in 2 months preceding the focal 
IPO is negative and significant (β=-.00, p<0.05), suggesting that the more IPOs in 2 
months prior to IPO, the less likely the focal firm includes any secondary shares. Model 2 
is the second stage and the dummy if the focal firm includes any secondary shares is 
negative and marginally significant (β=-7.02, p<0.1). This result is consistent with the 
results in Table 4. In addition, Model 3 is the first stage predicting the percentage of 
secondary shares in an offering. Similarly, the number of IPOs in 2 months preceding the 
focal IPO is negative and significant (β=-0.06, p<0.001). Model 4 is the second stage and 
the percentage of secondary shares in an offering is negative and significant (β=-.10, 
p<0.05). The result is also consistent with the results in regular OLS in Table 4.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------ 
 To test the interaction terms, I follow Dahl and Sorenson (2012) to generate the 
predicted percentage of secondary shares in an offering from the first stage of the 
instrumental analysis in Model 3 Table 5. Using the predicted percentage, I generate the 
interaction terms with pre-IPO total asset. I tested the interaction terms in Table 6. Model 
1 includes control variables. Model 2 includes the interaction of the percentage of 




an OLS regression and show that the percentage is negative and significant (β=-.05, 
p<0.01) and the interaction is positive and significant (β=.01, p<0.05). In Model 3, I use 
the predicted percentage of secondary shares in an offering from the first stage of 
instrumental variable analysis in Model 3 as my independent variable and created the 
interaction terms. In Model 3, the predicted percentage is negative and significant (β=-.24, 
p<0.01) and the interaction is positive and significant (β=.02, p<0.05). These results 
suggest that a high percentage of secondary shares in an offering is associated with 
slower post-IPO R&D growth but this relationship is weaker for firms with more total 
assets, i.e., larger firms. Therefore, the results suggest that when insiders sell more 
secondary shares in an offering, their effort decrease has a smaller impact on large firms.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------ 
 In summary, insiders’ secondary share sales have a significant negative impact on 
post-IPO R&D growth rate and this negative effect is weaker for large firms.  
  
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
  
Although prior studies heavily draw on agency theory to examine agency 
behavior, many of these studies focus on large public firms and ignore how equity 
ownership functions in small entrepreneurial firms. In addition, because of the limitation 
of the research context, it is hard for prior studies to draw a causal inference between 
equity ownership and managerial behavior or firm performance. This study focuses on 
small entrepreneurial firms and examines how equity ownership changes influence firm 




approach to address the endogeneity issue and tries to identify a causal relationship. 
Furthermore, prior studies largely ignore the contingencies under which the effect of 
equity ownership varies. Without this knowledge, equity ownership may not be able to be 
taken advantage to its fullest extent. This paper identified one important contingency: 
firm size.  
 My findings elucidate the influence of insiders secondary share sales at the IPO, 
and firm size on post-IPO R&D growth rate by demonstrating: (1) there is a negative 
relationship between insiders’ secondary share sales and post-IPO R&D growth rate; (2) 
the relationship is less negative for large firms. These findings contribute to agency-based 
studies and entrepreneurship literature in several ways.  
 First, prior studies largely ignore how equity ownership impacts firm outcomes in 
small entrepreneurial firms. Many prior studies focus on large public firms and the 
evidence about its impact on firm performance is weak. In addition, many prior studies 
cannot draw a causal inference between equity ownership and firm outcomes because of 
many intervening factors associated with the research context. This study focused on 
small entrepreneurial IPO firms and adopted an instrumental variable approach to draw a 
causal inference. The findings suggest that equity ownership does have an incentive 
alignment effect, specifically, the higher the percentage of secondary shares in an IPO, 
the slower the post-IPO R&D growth rate. I also explored other outcome measures and 
found no significant results. This finding suggests that other outcomes may be less 
sensitive to insiders’ secondary share sales at least in one year post-IPO. R&D growth is 
the one that is significantly affected. This may be because compared to other outcomes, 




they can immediately lower R&D expenditures. In contrast, sales are based on contracts 
in many cases and hence cannot easily be changed in a short period of time. Therefore, 
sales growth or decrease is less sensitive to insiders’ intent.  
Another possible reason about the findings on R&D growth is that insiders turn to 
other sources of innovation instead of internal R&D after they decrease their interest 
stake in the firm. Firms can get innovations either from internal R&D development or 
external acquisition. It may not be that insiders lower their commitment to the firm after 
they sell part of the secondary shares but they choose different sources of innovation. 
They may become more inclined to find external sources of innovation rather than 
internal R&D. I need to collect data on external acquisition in one year post-IPO to test 
the idea if they gain innovation from external environment.  
 Second, this paper also finds that the alignment effect of equity ownership varies 
with firm size. Specifically, the negative impact of insiders’ secondary share sales at the 
IPO on post-IPO R&D growth is smaller for large firms. This finding suggests that 
compared with large firms, small firms rely more on insiders’ decision to grow R&D. As 
suggested above, this may be because at the time of the IPO, small firms may be still in 
their early stage of development; their R&D has not been routinized or does not have 
long-term plans and still heavily relies on insiders’ short-term decisions. When insiders 
sell part of their secondary shares, they lower their commitment to the firm and an 
immediate consequence is that they slow down their R&D expenditure. In general, this 
finding suggests that in small firms, R&D expenditure decision has a shorter distance to 




To conclude, by using 500 U.S. software IPOs from 1990 to 2011, I find that 
there is a negative relationship between the percentage of secondary shares in an IPO and 






Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Variables Mean SD 
1 Sale (1y) 3.69 1.21 
2 Sale growth rate (1y) 1.72 7.82 
3 Sale growth rate (1y)/(-1y) -2.45 92.41 
4 R&D expenditure (1y) 2.24 1.00 
5 R&D growth rate (1y) 1.34 2.19 
6 R&D growth rate(1y)/(-1y) -1.58 108.69 
7 Dummy if firm sells secondary shares 0.49 0.50 
8 % of secondary shares in all issuing 11.81 15.80 
9 % sold by CEO relative to firm 0.01 0.02 
10 % sold by non-CEO execs relative to firm 0.01 0.01 
11 % sold by outside directors relative to firm 0.01 0.04 
12 % sold by CEO relative to own holding 0.02 0.05 
13 % sold by non-CEO execs relative to own holding 0.03 0.08 
14 % sold by outside directors relative to own holding 0.05 0.10 
15 # IPOs in 2 months pre-IPO 120.47 51.59 
16 Pre-IPO RD growth rate (-1y) 0.32 1.00 
17 Firm pre-IPO total assets (-1y) 2.56 1.33 
18 Firm pre-IPO total sales (-1y) 2.74 1.30 
19 Firm pre-IPO R&D expenditure (-1y) 1.51 0.85 
20 Firm age 8.30 5.58 
21 Offer price/book value 7.17 0.31 
22 IPO proceeds 3.44 0.85 
23 Underwriter prestige 7.24 2.04 
24 VC dummy 0.65 0.48 
25 90-98 period dummy 0.60 0.49 


















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
1 sale (1y) 1.00
2 sale growth rate (1y) -0.26 1.00
3 sale growth rate (1y)/(-1y) 0.04 -0.05 1.00
4 rd expenditure (1y) 0.62 -0.16 0.06 1.00
5 rd growth rate (1y) -0.12 0.07 0.04 -0.15 1.00
6 rd growth rate(1y)/(-1y) -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.05 1.00
7 dummy if firm sells secondary shares 0.24 -0.14 0.04 -0.03 -0.06 0.01 1.00
8 % of secondary shares in all issuing 0.23 -0.12 0.03 -0.01 -0.07 0.04 0.77 1.00
9 % sold by CEO relative to firm 0.04 -0.06 0.01 -0.10 0.11 -0.04 0.37 0.40 1.00
10 % sold by non-ceo execs relative to firm 0.05 -0.05 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.34 0.34 0.39 1.00
11 % sold by outside directors relative to firm 0.08 -0.07 0.01 -0.04 -0.09 0.00 0.40 0.51 0.07 0.06 1.00
12 % sold by CEO relative to own holding 0.10 -0.08 0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.49 0.53 0.70 0.50 0.17 1.00
13
% sold by non-ceo execs relative to own 
holding 0.08 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.39 0.35 0.29 0.48 0.13 0.44 1.00
14
% sold by outside directors relative to own 
holding 0.11 -0.08 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.46 0.55 0.15 0.16 0.65 0.28 0.19 1.00
15 # IPOs in 2 months pre-IPO -0.19 0.10 0.01 -0.15 0.19 -0.03 -0.07 -0.13 -0.03 -0.01 -0.13 -0.09 -0.03 -0.16 1.00
16 Pre-IPO RD growth rate (-1y) 0.22 -0.02 0.02 0.45 -0.22 0.02 -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 -0.04 -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 1.00
17 Firm pre-IPO total assets (-1y) 0.71 -0.28 0.03 0.59 -0.25 -0.01 0.15 0.19 -0.03 -0.01 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.10 -0.29 0.19 1.00
18 Firm pre-IPO total sales (-1y) 0.75 -0.30 0.00 0.36 -0.21 -0.03 0.35 0.34 0.11 0.09 0.16 0.17 0.11 0.20 -0.26 -0.06 0.77 1.00
19 Firm pre-IPO R&D expenditure (-1y) 0.52 -0.18 0.00 0.78 -0.38 0.02 0.05 0.06 -0.11 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.25 0.14 0.69 0.56 1.00
20 Firm age 0.22 -0.15 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.05 0.27 0.26 0.20 0.15 0.11 0.18 0.15 0.18 -0.06 -0.18 0.28 0.47 0.17 1.00
21 Offer price/book value 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.01 1.00
22 IPO proceeds 0.63 -0.18 0.10 0.66 -0.22 -0.01 0.11 0.14 -0.05 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.09 -0.26 0.34 0.67 0.45 0.55 0.05 0.00 1.00
23 Underwriter prestige 0.61 -0.20 0.13 0.65 -0.17 0.01 0.19 0.18 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.07 -0.15 0.30 0.59 0.44 0.51 0.07 0.01 0.73 1.00
24 VC dummy 0.22 -0.11 -0.02 0.37 -0.13 0.03 0.06 0.02 -0.12 -0.08 0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.07 -0.03 0.16 0.23 0.10 0.26 -0.08 -0.01 0.29 0.44 1.00
25 90-98 period dummy -0.22 0.01 -0.05 -0.35 0.12 -0.02 0.35 0.30 0.22 0.18 0.12 0.21 0.16 0.15 0.33 -0.22 -0.31 -0.07 -0.29 0.09 -0.02 -0.52 -0.31 -0.18 1.00
26 99-00 period dummy 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.27 -0.01 0.02 -0.39 -0.36 -0.18 -0.15 -0.21 -0.23 -0.16 -0.23 0.14 0.28 0.05 -0.17 0.05 -0.20 0.01 0.31 0.24 0.18 -0.71 1.00




Table 3: Results Summary (DVs are in one year post-IPO) 
 
Note IV Sales Sales growth rate RD RD growth rate Capital expenditure Asset turnover
Operating return on 
assets
Operating cash 
flows deflated by 
total assets
add separately
Dummy if firm sells secondary 
shares NS NS NS Negative Negative NS NS NS
add separately
% of secondary shares in all shares 
sold at IPO
Marginally negative 
(One tail) NS Marginally negative Negative Negative NS NS NS
% sold by CEO relative to all firm 
shares NS Negative NS NS Negative NS NS NS
% sold by Non-CEO executives 
relative to all firm shares NS NS NS Negative NS NS NS NS
% sold by outside directors 
relative to all firm shares Negative NS Marginally negative Negative Negative NS NS NS
% sold by CEO relative to own 
holding
Marginally negative 
(One tail) Marginally negative NS NS Negative Positive NS NS
% sold by Non-CEO executives 
relative to own holding NS NS NS NS NS Negative NS NS
% sold by outside directors 
relative to own holding Negative NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
add to regression 
simultaneously







Table 4: OLS results (Post-IPO R&D growth rate as dependent variable) 
  1 2 3 4 
Variables  Post-IPO RD growth rate (1y) 
 
        










   
(0.006) 
 % sold by CEO relative to all firm shares 
   
11.08 
    
(12.379) 
% sold by non-CEO executives relative to all firm shares 
   
-13.58* 
    
(5.807) 
% sold by outside directors relative to all firm shares 
   
-5.86** 
    
(1.961) 
Pre-IPO RD growth rate (-1y) -0.53*** -0.55*** -0.55*** -0.54*** 
 
(0.156) (0.157) (0.159) (0.157) 
Firm pre-IPO total assets (-1y) 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.32 
 
(0.204) (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) 
Firm pre-IPO total sales (-1y) -0.19 -0.13 -0.14 -0.16 
 
(0.130) (0.126) (0.128) (0.129) 
Firm pre-IPO R&D expenditure (-1y) -1.20*** -1.26*** -1.26*** -1.22*** 
 
(0.291) (0.293) (0.299) (0.293) 
Firm age -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Offer price/book value 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.09 
 
(0.093) (0.096) (0.097) (0.111) 
IPO proceeds 0.06 0.12 0.15 0.16 
 
(0.250) (0.244) (0.253) (0.261) 
Underwriter prestige 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.07 
 
(0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.119) 
VC dummy -0.33 -0.32 -0.34 -0.29 
 
(0.271) (0.267) (0.269) (0.292) 
90-98 period dummy 0.38 0.56* 0.56* 0.46+ 
 
(0.253) (0.258) (0.277) (0.262) 
99-00 period dummy 0.48* 0.39+ 0.39+ 0.42* 
 
(0.212) (0.213) (0.208) (0.207) 
Constant 1.34 1.19 1.03 1.32 
 
(1.100) (1.085) (1.114) (1.170) 
     Observations 500 500 500 500 
R-squared 0.201 0.209 0.211 0.219 
df_m 11 12 12 14 
Ll -1047 -1044 -1044 -1041 






Table 5: Instrumental variable analysis (2SLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
  




growth rate (1y) 




growth rate (1y) 














  % of secondary shares in issuing 
   
-0.10* 
    
(0.054) 
Pre-IPO RD growth rate (-1y) -0.03* -0.74** -1.08* -0.63*** 
 
(0.014) (0.261) (0.483) (0.188) 
Firm pre-IPO total assets (-1y) -0.03 0.14 -0.29 0.32 
 
(0.030) (0.269) (0.847) (0.203) 
Firm pre-IPO total sales (-1y) 0.12*** 0.67 3.03*** 0.12 
 
(0.026) (0.621) (0.680) (0.180) 
Firm pre-IPO R&D expenditure (-1y) -0.13*** -2.14* -4.26*** -1.61*** 
 
(0.034) (0.841) (1.230) (0.417) 
Firm age 0.01 0.03 0.25+ 0.01 
 
(0.004) (0.042) (0.152) (0.020) 
Offer price/book value -0.04* -0.13 -0.64 0.07 
 
(0.018) (0.240) (0.622) (0.129) 
IPO proceeds 0.13** 0.96 5.84*** 0.61 
 
(0.042) (0.750) (1.298) (0.386) 
Underwriter prestige 0.04** 0.38 0.90+ 0.18 
 
(0.016) (0.261) (0.458) (0.131) 
VC dummy 0.04 -0.08 -0.17 -0.36 
 
(0.049) (0.403) (1.680) (0.298) 
90-98 period dummy 0.42*** 2.87 16.33*** 1.48* 
 
(0.074) (1.924) (2.385) (0.698) 
99-00 period dummy -0.13 -0.91 -0.72 -0.06 
 
(0.081) (1.140) (2.215) (0.402) 
Constant -0.23 -0.71 -15.15* -0.53 
 
(0.196) (2.246) (6.338) (1.491) 
     Observations 500 500 500 500 
R-squared 0.355 -1.220 0.324 -0.037 
df_m 12 12 12 12 
ll -253.1 -1303 -2004 -1112 







Table 6: Test of interaction (OLS) 
  1 2 3 
VARIABLES Post-IPO RD growth rate (1y) 
 
      










 % of secondary shares in issuing (predicted) 
  
-0.24** 
   
(0.090) 
% of secondary shares in issuing (predicted) * Pre-IPO total asset 
 
0.02* 
   
(0.008) 
Pre-IPO RD growth rate (-1y) -0.53*** -0.56*** -0.63*** 
 
(0.156) (0.162) (0.180) 
Firm pre-IPO total assets (-1y) 0.32 0.29 0.02 
 
(0.204) (0.199) (0.187) 
Firm pre-IPO total sales (-1y) -0.19 -0.18 0.45+ 
 
(0.130) (0.133) (0.242) 
Firm pre-IPO R&D expenditure (-1y) -1.20*** -1.33*** -1.89*** 
 
(0.291) (0.306) (0.470) 
Firm age -0.01 -0.01 0.03+ 
 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.020) 
Offer price/book value 0.11 0.10 -0.05 
 
(0.093) (0.090) (0.115) 
IPO proceeds 0.06 0.14 1.11* 
 
(0.250) (0.251) (0.509) 
Underwriter prestige 0.09 0.13 0.28+ 
 
(0.114) (0.116) (0.144) 
VC dummy -0.33 -0.30 -0.07 
 
(0.271) (0.260) (0.218) 
90-98 period dummy 0.38 0.66* 2.49** 
 
(0.253) (0.276) (0.940) 
99-00 period dummy 0.48* 0.42* -0.67 
 
(0.212) (0.203) (0.543) 
Constant 1.34 1.11 -1.59 
 
(1.100) (1.088) (1.569) 
    Observations 500 500 500 
R-squared 0.201 0.218 0.226 
df_m 11 13 13 
Ll -1047 -1042 -1039 









CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
  
In this three-essay dissertation, to tease apart several theories such as agency 
theory, signaling theory and risk aversion, I examine the antecedents and performance 
consequences of insiders’ secondary share sales at the IPO.  Managerial equity ownership 
has been widely adopted in practice. Whether and to what extent managerial equity 
ownership affects executive actions and organization outcomes have been an important 
research question. Although prior studies provided some insights, the findings have been 
inconsistent or inconclusive at best (Devers, McNamara, Wiseman, and Arrfelt, 2008; 
Wowak and Hambrick, 2010). This dissertation contributes to this stream of research by 
investigating how equity ownership affects one particular action: insiders’ secondary 
share sales at the IPO and the associated short- and long-term performance outcomes.  
Theoretical Contributions 
 The first contribution of the dissertation is that insiders’ secondary share sales are 
not significantly associated with poor post-IPO performance. This finding does not 
provide support either to agency theory or signaling theory. The finding is more 
consistent with risk aversion. Therefore, insiders’ secondary share sales are not 
necessarily a negative signal and traditional wisdom may over-emphasize its possible 
negative consequences. The selling is mostly driven by a wealth diversification motive. 
Even if insiders sell part of their shares at the IPO, such sales do not necessarily lower 
their commitment to the firm. At least, most of the outcomes are not significantly 
influenced by insiders’ secondary share sales at the IPO.   
The second theoretical contribution of the dissertation is in identifying the 




Equity ownership not only aligns CEO interest and firm interest but also creates risk for 
CEOs (Devers, McNamara, Wiseman and Arrfelt, 2008). Although prior studies 
identified some contingencies under which the risk effect of equity ownership varies 
(Wowak and Hambrick, 2010) such as CEO social psychological characteristics, this 
dissertation identifies CEO founder status as another important contingency and extends 
beyond CEO characteristics to include board actions as another contingency. Specifically, 
the same amount of equity ownership implies higher risks for founder CEOs since 
founders usually have a greater share of their wealth invested in the firm. Therefore, 
founder CEOs behave differently than non-founder CEOs even with similar equity 
ownership. Furthermore, CEO behavior driven by equity ownership is also contingent on 
external governance. Different from studies with a focus on board composition (see a 
review in Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003), this dissertation focuses on how board actions 
affect CEO behavior. Specifically, since insiders’ share sales at IPO may be interpreted 
as a negative signal by the market, when board members engage in share sales, it implies 
a weakened CEO oversight. (Perhaps because board members are less morally powerful 
to prevent the CEO from doing the same thing). Therefore, it will be easier for CEOs to 
sell shares when board members do as well. In summary, the impact of equity ownership 
on CEO behavior is contingent on CEO founder status and board actions.  
 The third contribution of the dissertation is in finding the value that IPO firms can 
capture when insiders sell shares at the IPO. Although it is widely documented in theories 
and anecdotal evidence that insiders’ share sales at the IPO are interpreted as a negative 
signal by the market, this dissertation finds that IPO firms can actually raise more 




higher offer price. As such, shareholders may benefit when insiders sell shares at the IPO. 
Furthermore, this dissertation finds that not all insiders have the same effect when they 
sell shares. That is, only outside directors (VCs and other institutional investors) can 
bargain for a higher offer price while CEOs cannot. This finding suggests that outside 
directors have more bargaining power over underwriters compared with CEOs. This may 
be because outside directors are institutional investors, who have repeated business 
relationships with underwriters. To gain future business opportunities from these 
institutions, underwriters are willing to work for their interests. In contrast, CEOs, as 
individuals, usually do not have opportunities to bring multiple firms to their IPOs or 
have future business opportunities with underwriters, which renders CEOs less powerful 
in bargaining with underwriters. These findings provide insights on the role of outside 
directors in the IPO process and the value they can create for the IPO firms when they 
sell shares at IPO. 
 The fourth contribution is in identifying the contingencies under which the 
incentive alignment effect of equity ownership varies. Although prior studies suggest that 
equity ownership can align insiders’ interest and firm interest (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), they largely ignore the contingencies under which the alignment effect varies. This 
dissertation identifies one contingency: firm size. Specifically, this dissertation finds that 
the percentage of secondary shares in an offering is associated with slower post-IPO 
R&D growth and the relationship is stronger for smaller firms. This may be because 
smaller firms are likely to have more immature bureaucracies which lead to greater 
influence of individuals. This finding suggests that the equity ownership has differential 




 The fifth contribution is the empirical contribution that this dissertation adopted 
an instrumental variable approach to address potential endogeneity issues. Because of the 
limitations of data, sample, and research context, prior studies have difficulty in 
identifying causal relationships. By adopting an instrumental variable approach, this 
dissertation tries to identify a causal relationship between the change of equity ownership 
and future firm performance outcomes. It is important to do so because private 
information gained by a CEO can result in both equity ownership changes and 
performance variations, suggesting a simple correlation instead of a causal relationship. 
This dissertation provides a solid empirical basis for future studies on equity ownership.  
 Taken together, this dissertation contributes to the research on equity ownership 
by examining the antecedents and consequences of secondary share sales at the IPO. The 
key finding of this dissertation is that when the proportion of the dollar value of equity 
ownership in the CEO’s whole interest stake in the firm is high, the CEO is more likely to 
sell part of the shares to reduce risks. This relationship is stronger when the CEO is the 
founder. CEOs are also more likely to sell shares when board members sell shares. 
Furthermore, outside directors’ share sales at the IPO are significantly associated with 
upward offer price revision and as a result IPO firms can raise more proceeds through 
having a lower underpricing. Lastly, insiders’ share sales at the IPO are associated with 
lower post-IPO R&D growth and this relationship is less negative for large firms.  
Future Research 
 This dissertation opens new and promising research opportunities for future 
research. First, this dissertation identifies a CEO’s wealth constraint as a contingency for 




enlarged when a CEO faces a wealth constraint. Although I tried to control for wealth-
related variables as much as possible, the CEO founder status used in this dissertation is 
an imperfect proxy for wealth constraints. This is a limitation of my data. It would be 
better if future research could collect detailed information of the CEO’s personal wealth 
and further test if the wealth constraints play a role in influencing equity ownership’s 
incentive alignment.  
 Second, this dissertation identifies board actions as another important contingency 
for CEOs’ shares sales. It is interesting if future research can reveal the process through 
which board members and CEOs bargain to sell shares at the IPO. What I observe in this 
dissertation is the result that board members’ share selling behavior influences CEOs’ 
share sales. The bargaining process is unobservable through the data this dissertation 
collected. However, it will inform us more about the governance dynamics between 
board members and CEOs if we can know more about the bargaining process. Given that 
board members and managerial equity are two widely adopted governance mechanisms 
in practice, thorough knowledge of the bargaining between the board and CEO can help 
us have a better understanding of how board governance interacts with equity ownership 
in governing CEOs.  
 Third, this dissertation finds that the negative impact of insiders’ share sales at the 
IPO is less severe for large firms. However firm size is a crude proxy for more mature 
and routinized support for R&D, as it may capture other factors as well. Given my 
current data, I cannot identify if some other, unobserved factor is at play. Future research 
can take a step further to examine what particular factors associated with large firms 




 In conclusion, this dissertation advances our knowledge on equity ownership, 
corporate governance, institutional investors including VCs, and founders and contributes 
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